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Shame	in	early	modern	thought:	from	sin	to	sociability	
Hannah	Dawson1		ABSTRACT	This	article	challenges	the	historiographical	narrative	that	modernity	saw	a	transition	from	shame	 to	guilt.	 I	 argue	not	only	 that	 these	 two	concepts	overlapped,	but	 that,	 if	anything,	a	shift	occurred	in	the	opposite	direction:	from	guilt	to	shame.	I	identify	two	concepts	of	shame:	guilt-shame,	focused	on	sinfulness	and	caused	by	mere	introspection,	and	reputation-shame,	focused	on	social	norms	and	caused	by	the	(albeit	imagined)	gaze	of	others.	Looking	primarily	at	English	texts,	straying	often	into	the	European	republic	of	letters,	I	argue	that	in	the	seventeenth	century,	as	Biblicist	fervour	gave	way	to	natural	religion	and	a	naturalistic	turn	in	moral	philosophy,	and	as	burgeoning	public	spheres	needed	governing,	reputation-shame	experienced	a	new	lease	of	life.	This	argument,	in	turn,	 questions	 the	 characterisation	 of	 the	 modern	 self	 as	 private,	 insulated	 and	autonomous,	 gesturing	 instead	 at	 open,	 social	 minds	 that	 were	 nonetheless	 deeply,	passionately,	interiorised.	In	picking	apart	these	interwoven	strands	in	the	history	of	the	concept	of	shame,	I	hope	to	make	the	methodological	point	that	one	cannot	be	essentialist	about	concepts.	There	is	no	concept	of	shame	that	can	be	analysed	abstracted	from	time	and	space,	only	particular	uses	of	the	concept	in	particular	utterances.		 I	Shame	is	a	peculiarly	potent	moral	concept.	In	part,	that	is	because	it	tends	to	have	an	affective	component,	and	therefore	moves	and	motivates	us,	as	well	as	engaging	us	 in	consideration	 of	 some	 indecency,	 or	 wrongness,	 in	 ourselves.2	 It	 is	 a	 feeling	 of	 self-reflexive	unease	that	seems	so	hard-wired	that	 it	has	a	physical	manifestation:	shame	makes	us	blush,	our	bodies	recording	its	presence	like	tears	record	sadness.	One	might	think	that	an	emotion	so	primal,	so	basic	 to	human	animals,	would	have	no	place	 in	a	collection	of	articles	on	the	history	of	concepts.	Indeed,	psychoanalysts	have	wondered	why	shame	seems	to	be	organic,	why	it	seems	to	be	an	essential,	irreducible	feature	of	being	 human.	 In	 The	 Interpretation	 of	 Dreams	 (1899),	 Freud	 said	 that	 in	 the	 ‘age	 of	childhood	…	the	sense	of	shame	is	unknown’,	but	is	an	inevitable	feature	of	growing	up,	both	 individually	and	as	a	 civilisation.3	He	proposed	 in	Civilization	and	 its	Discontents	
                                                             
1 I am indebted to Edward Skidelsky for inviting me to submit an article for this collection, and for the trenchantly 
brilliant comments I received in the process of peer review. I am also grateful to Richard Ellis, Laura Gowing, and 
William Tullett for their invaluable suggestions as the article took shape. This acknowledgement does not do 
justice to the shamelessness with which I have run away with their ideas. 
2 On shame figured as a passion from antiquity through to early modernity, see Susan James, Passion and Action: 
The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 5 and passim.  
3 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, trans. A.A. Brill (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 
1997), 139-40. For further psychoanalytic treatments of shame, see, for example, Malcolm Pines, ‘Shame – What 
Psychoanalysis Does and Does Not Say’, Group Analysis 20 (1987): 16-31; Heinz Weiss, ‘Introduction: The role of 
shame in psychoanalytic theory and practice’, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis 96 (2015), 1585-8. Cf. 
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(1930)	that	when	‘man’,	who	had	been	a	beast	on	four	legs,	stood	up	on	two,	‘this	made	his	genitals,	which	were	previously	concealed,	visible	and	in	need	of	protection,	and	so	provoked	feelings	of	shame	in	him’.4	And	certainly,	shame	seems	to	have	a	deep-rooted	conceptual	entanglement	with	sex.	One	of	the	possible	translations	of	the	Greek	word,	
aidōs,	 is	 shame,	while	aidoia	 has	 been	 used	 to	mean	 shameful,	 or	 private,	 parts.	 This	conceptual	intimacy	also	bleeds	into	Latin,	or	coy	Latin,	with	pudenda	–	sexual	organs,	and	pudor	–	shame.5		Historians,	however,	students	of	change,	and	anthropologists,	traditionally	explorers	of	difference,	 joined	 the	 fray	 by	 focusing	 on	 shame	 as	 a	 contingent,	 culturally	 specific	phenomenon.	In	Cooperation	and	Competition	among	Primitive	Peoples	(1937),	Margaret	Mead	 distinguished	 between	 shame	 cultures,	 in	 which	 the	 sanctions	 by	 which	 an	individual	 is	 controlled	 are	 external,	 and	 guilt	 cultures,	 in	 which	 the	 sanctions	 are	internal.6	In	a	shame	culture,	one	looks	out	at	the	eyes	of	others,	and	acts	to	avoid	their	ridicule	or	abuse.	In	a	guilt	culture,	one’s	gaze	turns	inward,	and	conscience	is	our	guide.	While	the	sufferer	of	guilt	experiences	‘a	disordered	state	within	the	psyche’,	the	person	who	breaks	a	 taboo	 ‘in	societies	 in	which	 the	 individual	 is	 controlled	by	 fear	of	being	shamed	…	is	safe	if	no	one	knows	of	his	misdeed’.7	‘He	can’,	on	Mead’s	account,	‘dismiss	his	misbehaviour	from	his	mind’.8	One	story	the	West	likes	to	tell	itself	is	that	it	has	come	on	a	journey	from	primitive	shame	to	 developed	 guilt	 –	 from	 the	world	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 theatre,	 a	 stage	 of	 appearances	 and	shadows,	a	life	lived	on	the	outside,	to	richly	interiorised	consciousness.	According	to	this	narrative,	 we	 have	 left	 behind	 our	 brutal	 beginnings	 in	 small,	 tight-knit,	 face-to-face	communities,	 and	 entered	 a	 more	 sophisticated	 condition	 of	 individuation	 and	 self-regulation	 in	 the	 anonymised,	 atomised	 modern	 state.	 Here,	 ‘honour	 killings’,	 for	example,	 are	 events	 that	 take	 place	 elsewhere.	 Historians	 differ	 as	 to	 the	 nature	 and	
                                                             
Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni, In Defense of Shame: The Faces of an Emotion (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011). 
4 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents in Civilization, Society and Religion, ed. and trans. Albert Dickson 
and James Strachey (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, 1985), 289. 
5 On pudicitia, see Rebecca Langlands, Sexual Morality in Ancient Rome (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
6 Margaret Mead, Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples (New York and London: McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1937), 493. 
7 Mead, Cooperation and Competition, 494. 
8 Ibid.  
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timing	of	the	alleged	transition.	E.R.	Dodds	made	an	influential	case	in	The	Greeks	and	the	
Irrational	(1951).	He	described	a	metamorphosis,	‘From	Shame-Culture	to	Guilt-Culture’,	that	 took	place	 in	 the	course	of	 the	Archaic	age,	 from	Homeric	heroes	concerned	with	saving	 face,	 to	 the	 Oedipal	 guilt	 that	we	 find	 in	 Sophocles	 and	 that	 is	 integral	 to	 the	‘cultural	 inheritance	 of	 Western	 Man’.9	 The	 same	 basic	 narrative	 was	 given	 a	 very	different	 evaluative	 complexion	 in	 Bernard	 Williams’	 classic	 account,	 Shame	 and	
Necessity	(1993).	Far	from	applauding	the	eclipse	of	shame	by	guilt,	Williams	mourns	its	loss	 in	 our	 conceptual	 architecture	 (he	 does	 not	 think	 that	 shame	 has	 actually	disappeared;	 indeed	he	 thinks	 it	 is	 the	only	way	of	properly	 recognising	ourselves).10	Criticising	the	psychological	simplicity	of	modern	caricatures	of	shame,	he	argues	that	the	shame	culture	of	the	ancient	Greeks	was	associated	with	what	he	calls	ethics	–	a	rich	and	realistic	system	of	normativity	that	integrates	self	and	other,	private	and	public,	and	internal	 and	 external.	 Modern	 Christian-Kantian	 consciousness,	 by	 contrast,	 deals	 in	guilt,	and	is	associated	with	so-called	morality	–	a	fantasy	of	reason	and	will	abstracted	from	real,	social,	life.		More	recently	in	A	History	of	Violence	From	the	End	of	the	Middle	Ages	to	the	Present	(2012,	originally	 published	 in	 French	 in	 2008),	 Robert	 Muchembled	 revisited	 the	 story,	reinscribing	it	as	a	narrative	of	progress,	and	proposing	that	the	conversion	from	shame	to	guilt	occurred	in	the	seventeenth	century.	Before	that	time,	he	writes,	‘the	law	of	shame	ruled	 this	world,	where	 the	 regard	of	others	mattered	much	more	 than	 self-regard’.11	Then,	in	about	1650,	a	convergence	of	judicial,	civic,	and	ecclesiastical	forces	in	a	Europe	soaked	with	the	blood	of	war,	produced	‘a	new	culture	of	personal	guilt	which	left	less	space	 than	 before	 to	 the	 collective	 sense	 of	 honour	 and	 the	 law	of	 shame’.12	 Echoing	Freud’s	image	of	the	boy	who	grows	up	to	be	a	man,	Muchembled	argues	that	as	part	of	the	historical	transformation	he	is	proposing,	‘the	West	invented	adolescence’,	the	new	regime	of	guilt	generating	repressed	young	men	with	a	new	respect	for	life,	and	for	the	
                                                             
9 E.R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1951), 28, 
49. 
10 Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University of California Press, 1993), 
4-12. 
11 Robert Muchembled, A History of Violence from the End of the Middle Ages to the Present (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2012), 26. 
12 Muchembled, A History of Violence, 27. 
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peace	now	enforced	by	‘the	institutions	proclaiming	themselves	guardians	of	legitimate	violence’.13	This	article	challenges	the	conventional	narrative.	I	argue	that	at	the	very	least	there	was	no	clean,	sequential	transition	from	shame	to	guilt,	but	rather	that	the	two	phenomena	overlapped,	and	that	if	anything,	a	transition	occurred	in	the	opposite	direction,	that	is,	from	guilt	to	shame.	To	be	more	precise,	focussing	in	on	the	seventeenth	century,	I	see	
two	concepts	of	shame	at	work	in	the	textual	traces	of	that	period.	I	am	going	to	focus	primarily	 on	 England,	 although	 I	 will	 bring	 in	 continental	 voices	 insofar	 as	 they	 are	relevant,	and	insofar	as	I	am	describing	a	discursive	shift	in	a	pan-European	republic	of	letters.	The	first	concept	I	will	call	guilt-shame.	This	is	shame	brought	about	by	being	seen	by	oneself,	or	by	God,	and	tends	to	have	as	its	object	moral	wrong,	or	sinfulness.	We	find	it	glowing	hot	 in,	roughly,	 the	 first	half	of	 the	seventeenth	century,	with	the	gathering	austerity	of	radical	Protestantism	and	its	Augustinian,	Calvinist	emphasis	on	original	sin.	The	second	concept	of	shame	I	call	reputation-shame.	This	 is	shame	brought	about	by	being	seen	by	others,	or	by	imagining	being	seen	by	others,	and	it	tends	to	have	as	its	object	the	conventional	values	of	the	community,	which	might	or	might	not	coincide	with	objective	morality,	or	the	law	of	God,	if	such	things	are	posited	at	all.	Versions	of	this	kind	of	shame	had	been	powerfully	articulated	not	only	in	ancient	Greece	but	in	ancient	Rome,	too,	 a	 culture	 obsessed	 by	 honour	 and	 civic	 virtue,	 and	 then	 variously	 revived	 in,	 for	example,	chivalric,	humanist,	and	early	modern	gendered	discourses.	 It	 finds	renewed	and	particular	expression	in	the	later	part	of	the	seventeenth	century,	in	the	intersecting	contexts	of	the	modern	state,	a	commercialising,	urbanising,	institutionalising	society,	as	well	 as	 the	 turn	 from	 revealed	 to	 natural	 religion,	 and	 the	 related	 interest	 that	philosophers	 began	 to	 take	 in	 naturalistic	 explanations	 for	 moral	 motivation	 and	obligation.		The	two	concepts	of	shame	differ,	therefore,	in	both	cause	and	referent:	guilt-shame	is	caused	 primarily	 by	 an	 internal	 spectator	 and	 refers	 primarily	 to	 divine	 morality,	whereas	 reputation-shame	 is	 caused	 primarily	 by	 an	 external	 spectator	 and	 refers	primarily	 to	 a	 social	 ethics.	 It	 is	my	 view	 not	 only	 that	 these	 two	 concepts	 of	 shame	
                                                             
13 Muchembled, A History of Violence, 29-30. See also ‘Shame, and a Challenge for Emotions History’, Emotion 
Review 8, no. 3 (2015), 197-206 on ‘the decline of shame’; John Braithwaite, ‘Shame and Modernity’, The British 
Journal of Criminology 33, no. 1 (1993), 1-18. 
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overlapped	in	the	seventeenth	century,	rather	than	following	one	upon	the	other,	as	the	established	story	goes,	but	also	that	–	now	turning	the	established	story	on	 its	head	–	guilt-shame	 held	 pole	 position	 in	 certain	 domains,	 especially	 moral	 thought,	 at	 the	beginning	of	century,	and	had	been	overtaken	by	reputation-shame	at	its	end.		These	 two	 concepts	 not	 only	 have	 different	 causes	 and	 referents,	 but	 also	 different	evaluative	or	affective	penumbra.	In	the	particular	seam	of	guilt-shame	that	I	excavate,	the	mood	is	dark,	and	full	of	loathing	for,	and	repression	of,	the	self,	and	there	is	no	earthly	redemption	 from	 one’s	 turpitude.	 Reputation-shame,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 while	 it	 is	dreadful	in	its	own	way,	both	in	prospect	and	in	actuality,	offers	an	escape	route	to	glory.	It	is	possible,	that	is	to	say,	to	act	in	such	a	way,	to	demonstrate	the	kind	of	character,	that	results	 in	 praise	 rather	 than	 blame,	 and	 thereby	 avoid	 the	 horrors	 of	 social	 disgrace.	Indeed,	this	dynamic	is	built	into	the	machinery	of	reputation-shame.	It	is	in	its	essence	to	turn	on	a	dime,	the	mere	flicker	of	the	prospect	of	censure	the	prompt	to	propriety.	While	shame	in	both	senses	has	a	self-hating	and	self-inhibitory	character,	a	contrivance	designed	to	make	us	be,	and	behave,	better,	guilt-shame	tends	towards	the	irreversibly	negative,	conclusively	unpleasant,	twisting	us	up	inside.	Reputation-shame,	however,	is	just	the	other	side	of	credit,	self-inhibition	simultaneously	opening	a	door	onto	social	life,	and	to	greater	security	and	pleasure	therein.	Living	according	to	reputation-shame,	that	is,	checking	yourself	in	the	light	of	what	others	think	of	you	and	feel	about	you,	becomes	a	 delicate	 process	 of	 personal	 recalibration	 and	 enrichment,	 a	 positive	 circulation	 of	affect	 through	 which	 we	might	 flourish,	 a	 rotation	 that	 both	 feeds	 off	 and	 generates	empathy.		Our	own	use	of	language	still	tracks	this	fissure	in	the	concept	of	shame.	On	the	one	hand,	we	 talk	of	 shame	as	a	problematic,	psychologically	damaging	emotion	 from	which	we	need	to	liberate	ourselves	–	the	shame	for	example,	of	sexual	desire,	or	looking	a	certain	way,	or	 feeling	worthless.	This	 is	 a	descendent	of	 guilt-shame,	 a	negative,	 grimly	 self-punitive	and	self-diminishing	thing.	On	the	other	hand,	we	talk	of	people	being	shameless,	where	that	is	the	worst	thing	one	can	be.	This	is	a	descendent	of	reputation-shame.	It	is	a	positive,	 intensely	ethical	 thing.	 It	 is	what	 integrates	us	 into	 society,	 tying	us	 to	other	people,	as	well	as	tying	us	back	from	hurting	them.	The	person	who	has	no	shame	in	this	second	sense	is	terrifying	because	there	is	no	line	they	will	not	cross.	They	do	not	care	what	you	think.	Indeed,	they	almost	thrive	on	your	gaping	horror.	So	locked	are	they	in	
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the	echo	chamber	of	their	minds,	so	mesmerised	by	their	reflection	in	the	pool,	that	they	are	unreachable.	Here,	shame	is	something	dearly	to	be	wished	for.	Of	 course,	 it	 need	 not	 be	 this	 way.	 The	 two	 concepts	 I	 have	 identified	 need	 not	 be	approached,	or	evaluated	as	I	have	just	proposed.	Christians	have	not	always	trumpeted	guilt-shame	as	a	necessary	part	of	the	human	condition.	Aquinas,	for	example,	having	a	far	brighter	view	than	Augustine	of	our	postlapsarian	state,	counted	 it	a	mortal	sin	to	wallow	dejectedly	in	our	defects.	This	is	acedia,	or	sloth,	‘a	heaviness	and	sadness,	that	so	weighs	down	the	soul	that	it	has	not	mind	to	do	anything’,	an	aversion	to	‘spiritual	good’.	There	is	proper	‘humility’	at	our	undeniable	faults,	but	this	must	not	be	confused	with,	or	tip	into,	improper	‘ingratitude’	at	the	‘good	gifts	that	he	has	from	God’.14	At	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum,	you	might	be	so	convinced	that	you	are	guilty,	and	that	salvation	comes	by	grace	alone	so	there	is	no	point	in	being	good,	that	you	liberate	yourself	entirely	from	moral	shackles.	This	is	antinomianism,	of	which,	for	example,	dissenters	were	accused	by	Anglican	conformists	in	Restoration	England.15	As	for	reputation-shame,	far	from	being	an	 ethically	 abundant	 and	 self-constitutive	 force,	 it	 might	 be	 thought	 to	 suffocate	authenticity,	a	person	having	no	space	to	find	her	own	desires,	her	own	path,	her	values	being	fixed	by	society.	Reputation-shame	might,	moreover,	amount	to	the	tyranny	of	the	majority,	‘the	tyranny’,	as	J.S.	Mill	puts	it	in	On	Liberty	(1859),	‘of	the	prevailing	opinion	and	feeling’.16	 ‘There	is	no	reason’,	Mill	elaborates,	 ‘that	all	human	existence	should	be	constructed	on	some	one	or	some	small	number	of	patterns	…	Human	beings	are	not	like	sheep’.17	Reputation-shame,	which	ties	us	to	the	eyes	of	others,	looks	in	this	light	like	it	might	herd	us	into	an	oppressive	conformism.	For	Jean-Paul	Satre,	writing	just	under	a	century	later	in	Being	and	Nothingness	(1943),	shame	is	foundational	to	self-alienation.	‘Shame’,	as	he	puts	it,	‘is	the	feeling	of	an	original	fall’,	whereby	the	free	‘I’	confronts	the	inevitable	mediation	of	‘the	Other’.18	
                                                             
14 Aquinas, Aquinas Ethicus: or, the Moral Teaching of St. Thomas, trans. Joseph Rickaby, 2 vols. (London: Burns 
and Oates, 1892), 1: 399-400. 
15 See, for example, Christopher Haigh, ‘‘Theological Wars’: ‘Socinians’ v. ‘Antinominans’ in Restoration England’, 
The Journal of Ecclesiastical History 67 (2016), 325-50. 
16 J.S. Mill, On Liberty in On Liberty and other writings, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989), 8. 
17 Mill, On Liberty, 67. 
18 Jean-Paul Satre, Being and Nothingness: An essay on phenomenological ontology, trans. Hazel E. Barnes 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2003), 312. 
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This	foray	into	alternative	semantic	worlds	demonstrates	the	methodological	point	that	one	cannot	be	essentialist	about	concepts.	They	do	not,	in	some	ideal	Platonic	form,	float	free	of	the	discourses	and	embodied	realities	in	which	they	are	articulated.	There	is	no	crisply	cut	concept	of	shame	that	one	can	analyse	and	define	in	abstraction	for	all	time.	There	are	only	particular	uses	of	the	concept	in	particular	utterances	at	particular	times.	I	have	pulled	out	two	distinct	uses	of	 the	concept	 in	seventeenth-century	texts.	 I	have	called	them	two	‘concepts’,	but	perhaps	that	is	not	right.	It	is	not	obvious	whether	they	are	 two	 concepts,	 or	 rather	 two	distinct	 configurations	of	 the	 same	 concept,	 one	 that	prioritises	introspection	and	divine	morality	and	judgement,	the	other	that	priorities	the	views	of	society.	They	both	 cluster	under	 the	same	word.	Moreover,	 the	 line	between	these	two	conceptual	configurations	 is	blurred.	Self	and	other	are	present	 in	both,	 the	internal	spectator	becoming	indistinguishable	from	the	external,	and	God’s	law	is	often	present	in	reputation-shame,	even	if	a	social	ethics	does	not	feature	as	obviously	in	guilt-shame.	Concepts	are	slippery	–	both	within	themselves,	as	with	shame,	and	between	each	other,	as	with	guilt	and	shame	–	and	it	is	part	of	my	purpose	to	point	precisely	to	their	fluid,	 historically	 contingent	 nature.19	 But	 the	 task	 of	 the	 historian	 is	 also	 to	mediate	between	the	particular	and	the	general,	to	find	patterns	and	commonalities	that	do	not	betray	the	ineffable	specificity	of	each	historical	moment,	to	plot	stories	that	bear	legible	relations	 to	 intrinsically	 unnarrativised	 series	 of	 events.	 Accordingly,	 I	 want	 to	 draw	attention	to	two	discrete	inflections	of	shame	in	the	seventeenth	century,	and	to	argue	that	 one	 found	 a	 powerful	 new	 incarnation	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 other,	 even	 as	 they	sometimes	 melted	 into	 each	 other,	 and	 while	 there	 were	 doubtless	 myriad	 other	contemporaneous	inflections	of	the	concept.		In	arguing	that	reputation-shame	shunted	guilt-shame	off	centre-stage	in	the	course	of	the	seventeenth	century,	I	am	not	only	challenging	the	narrative	of	a	transition	from	a	shame-culture	to	a	guilt-culture,	but	am	also	 lining	up	alongside	those	historians	who	have	argued	that	shame	emerged	as	a	distinctive	mark	and	mechanism	of	modernity.	The	key	figure	here,	whose	thesis	runs	through	much	of	the	current	historiography,	even	as	it	is	criticised	and	nuanced	by	it,	is	the	sociologist	Norbert	Elias.	His	The	Civilizing	Process:	
                                                             
19 See Douglas L. Cairns, Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) for a rebuttal of the guilt/shame distinction, and a defence of the psychological 
sophistication of aidos. Cf. Bernard Williams, Shame and Necessity, 88-94 on the relation between guilt and 
shame.  
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The	History	of	Manners,	originally	published	in	German	in	1939,	then	in	English	in	1969,	proposed	that	‘modern	Western	man’	(him	again)	was	‘civilized’	out	of	barbarism	by	way	of	a	‘psychical	process’	that	involved	a	‘change	in	feelings	of	shame	and	delicacy’.20	In	part,	what	I	am	offering	in	this	article	is	an	intellectual	history	to	add	to	the	already	powerful	narrative	 in	 social	 and	 cultural	 history	 about	 the	 appearance	 of	 shame	 in	 the	 early	modern	period.		However,	my	account	differs	with	regard	not	only	to	the	character	of	shame	–	Elias	et	al’s	is	bound	up	with	the	body,	whereas	mine	is	(more)	focused	on	morality	–	but	also	to	the	kind	 of	 selfhood	 that	 is	 envisaged	with	 the	 advent	 of	 shame.	 Elias	 saw	 the	 newfound	embarrassment	about	the	body	resulting	in,	as	well	as	from,	a	closing	off	from	the	world,	a	self	drawn	inward,	a	‘homo	clausus’	or	‘capsule’	self,	an	‘autonomous	individual’.21	This	image	of	 the	newly	shamed	self	as	a	sealed-off	 individual	 intersects	with	another,	still	powerful,	narrative	about	modern	selfhood	more	generally.	 In	Sources	of	 the	Self:	The	
Making	of	the	Modern	Identity	(1989),	Charles	Taylor,	for	example,	identified	‘inwardness’	as	an	integral	component	of	the	modern	subject.22		By	 contrast,	 I	 hope	 that	 throwing	 a	 light	 on	 early	 modern	 reputation-shame	 will	demonstrate	precisely	the	outwardness	of	early	modern	selfhood.23	Rather	than	see	the	(re)introduction	of	shame	as	signalling	a	withdrawal	 from	the	world	 into	an	 insulated	Cartesian	ego,	I	see	it	as	inserting	individuals	more	deeply	into	an	interpersonal	space.	In	this	regard	–	to	put	the	final	piece	of	the	historiographic	jigsaw	puzzle	in	place	–	I	hope	to	add	something	to	another	classic	story	about	modernity:	that	it	is	characterised	by	the	
                                                             
20 Norbert Elias, The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), xi-xiii. See, in 
criticism and elaboration: Gail Kern Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Disciplines of Shame in Early 
Modern England (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993); David Nash and Anne-Marie Kilday, Cultures 
of Shame: Exploring Crime and Morality in Britain 1600-1900 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
21 Elias, The Civilizing Process, 258; 257. 
22 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1989), 111. Cf. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson, eds., Reading the Early Modern 
Passions: Essays in the Cultural History of Emotion (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) which 
complicates and embodies, but broadly supports Taylor’s story, tracking a shift from an open, labile body, to a 
closed, static body. See also Dror Wahrman, The Making of the Modern Self: Identity and Culture in Eighteenth-
century England (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004). 
23 Here I am banding together with cultural historians who emphasise the leakiness, fluidity, and openness of 
early modern bodies experienced and conceived as healthy (as well as, in some cases and contexts, objects of 
shame). See, for example, Ulinka Rublack and Pamela Selwyn, ‘Fluxes: The Early Modern Body and the Emotions’, 
History Workshop Journal 53 (2002), 1-16; Michael Stolberg, Experiencing Illness and the Sick Body in Early 
Modern Europe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 128 on the importance of keeping the body ‘open’. Cf. 
Paster, The Body Embarrassed on the heavily gendered ways in which bodily secretions were appraised, e.g. the 
blood of soldiers voluntarily shed was laudable, whereas involuntary menstruation was shameful (64-112). 
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inauguration	 of	 the	 public	 sphere.	 This	 story,	 at	 least	 in	 Jürgen	 Habermas’s	 original	telling,	 has	 many	 problems	 –	 the	 eliteness,	 the	 maleness,	 the	 disembodiedness,	 the	decorum	 when	 there	 was	 also	 a	 lot	 of	 bawdiness,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 narrowness	 of	 the	evidence	and	the	categories	of	class	on	which	it	is	predicated.	However,	for	all	its	flaws,	the	 thesis	 hooks	 onto	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 is	 associated	with	 social	 and	 constitutional	change,	urbanisation,	and	new	spatial,	scientific,	and	textual	developments.24	It	seems	to	me	 that	 the	 renovation	 of	 the	 second	 concept	 of	 shame	 that	 I	 have	 identified	 is	 both	further	evidence	of,	and	was	integral	to,	the	burgeoning	public	sphere.	The	sudden	spurt	of	 energy	 in	 reputation-shame	 signalled	 both	 the	 need	 for	 and	 the	 means	 by	 which	nascent	civic	spaces	might	be	regulated	and	animated,	and	the	modern	subject	governed,	in	conjunction	with	formal	measures	that	were	instituted	for	this	purpose.25	It	gestures	towards	 how	men	 –	 and	 it	 was	 archetypically	 men	 –	 might	 come	 together	 in	 polite	conversation,	arresting	and	adapting	their	values	and	views	according	to	the	circulation	of	approval	and	disapproval,	of	pleasure	and	pain,	and	so	harmonise	their	perspectives,	as	well	as	make	themselves	legible	to	one	another.	The	second	concept	of	shame,	that	is,	facilitated	and	indicated	a	new	culture	of	sociability.		
                                                             
24 See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick 
Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989). For rich rethinkings, see Craig Calhoun, ed., Habermas and the Public 
Sphere (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992); Joan B. Landes, ‘The Public and the Private Sphere: A Feminist 
Reconsideration’, in Landes, ed., Feminism, the Public and the Private (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 
135-63; Special Issue, ‘Forum: Alternative Histories of the Public Sphere’, William and Mary Quarterly 62, no. 1 
(2005); Peter Lake and Steven Pincus, eds., The Politics of the Public Sphere in Early Modern England (Manchester 
and New York: Manchester University Press, 2007). See also Peter Borsay, The English Urban Renaissance: 
Culture and Society in the Provincial Town 1660-1770 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). On cultures of 
cooperation in the so-called scientific revolution, see for example Claire Preston, The Poetics of Scientific 
Investigation in Seventeenth-Century England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Thomas Browne and the 
Writing of Early Modern Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Steven Shapin, A Social History 
of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994); 
Christopher Lawrence and Steven Shapin, eds., Science Incarnate: Historical Embodiments of Natural Knowledge 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998). For further interrogation and counterpoints, see Anne Goldgar, 
Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters 1680-1750 (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1995); Helen Berry, ‘Rethinking Politeness in Eighteenth-Century England: Moll King’s Coffee House and 
the Significance of ‘Flash Talk’: The Alexander Prize Lecture’, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society 6 (2001), 
65-81; Vic Gatrell, City of Laughter: Sex and Satire in Eighteenth-Century London (London: Atlantic, 2006); Simon 
Dickie, Cruelty and Laughter: Forgotten Comic Literature and the Unsentimental Eighteenth Century (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2011).  
25 On early modern governmentality, see James Tully’s classic ‘Governing Conduct’ in Edmund Leites, ed., 
Conscience and Casuistry in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 12-71. Cf. 
Markku Peltonen, The Duel in Early Modern England: Civility, Politeness and Honour (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003); Laura Gowing, ‘Women, Status and the Popular Culture of Dishonour’, Transactions of 
the Royal Historical Society 6 (1996), 225-34; Domestic Dangers: Women, Words, and Sex in Early Modern London 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 111-38; Tim Reinke-Williams, Women, Work and Sociability in Early 
Modern London (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
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I	hope,	moreover,	to	lend	my	voice	to	the	argument	that	this	kind	of	public	sphere	was	getting	up	and	running	before	the	eighteenth	century.26	On	my	reading,	for	example,	John	Locke	does	not	mark	a	contrast	with,	but	rather	a	bridge	to	an	economy	of	sympathy.	This	earlier	 version	 of	 the	 public	 sphere	 should	 be	 understood	 not	 only	 as	 a	 polite,	gentlemanly	space,	but	also	as	an	intensely	passionate	and	intersubjective	one.	We	do	not	have	 to	 wait	 for	 David	 Hume	 or	 Adam	 Smith	 for	 a	 sociable	 and	 emotional	 view	 of	selfhood.27	 In	 addition	 to	 propounding	 an	 isolated	 consciousness,	 and	 a	 radically	individuated	personal	identity	(as	the	philosophy	books	so	often	tell	it),	Locke	envisages	selves	that	are	open	to	other	selves.		In	sum,	then,	this	article	is	about	one	particular	path	that	the	use	of	the	concept	of	shame	took	in	the	seventeenth	century,	among	the	many	paths	that	the	concept	has	taken	since	antiquity.	It	seems	to	me	that	shame	turned	its	sights	up	and	away	from	the	darkness	of	one's	 body	 and	 soul,	 and,	 with	 replenished	 vitality,	 out	 into	 the	 world.	 Far	 from	disappearing	 from	 view,	 shame	 was	 reinvigorated	 as	 a	 sympathetic	 instrument	 of	common	life,	a	diffuser	of	a	conventional	ethics,	in	a	way	that	points	to	remarkably	social	and	sensible,	but	no	less	interiorised,	minds	and	selves.		 II	In	A	Christian	Dictionarie,	published	in	London	in	1612,	Thomas	Wilson	motions	towards	the	 two	 concepts	 of	 shame	 that	 I	 have	 sketched	 above,	 demonstrating	 both	 their	distinctness,	 and	 their	 contemporaneity.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 he	 defines	 ‘Shame’	 as	 ‘An	affection	which	springeth,	by	reason	of	some	civill	dishonesty	or	filthinesse,	appearing	in	
                                                             
26 For a few ways into the vast literature on the vibrancy of the public sphere before the eighteenth century, see 
Adam Fox, ‘Rumour, News and Popular Political Opinion in Elizabethan and Early Stuart England’, Historical 
Journal 40 (1997), 597-620; Adam Fox, Oral and Literate Culture in England 1500-1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
2000); Joad Raymond, Pamphlets and Pamphleteering in Early Modern Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003); Joad Raymond, The Invention of the Newspaper: English Newsbooks, 1641-1649 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1996); Andrew Pettegree, The Invention of News. How the World Came to Know About Itself (New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press, 2014); Judith Pollman and Andrew Spicer, eds., Public Opinion and Changing Identities 
in the Early Modern Netherlands: Essays In Honour of Alasdair Duke (Leiden: Brill, 2007).  
27 See Jerold Siegel, The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experience in Western Europe Since the Seventeenth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Siegel traces a line from Locke, through Mandeville and 
Hume, to Smith, arguing that with the latter we get ‘the most developed’ account of ‘the relational dimension 
as essential to the construction of stable self-existence’ (167). Siegel finds intimations of this in Locke, in the 
developing commercial society and republic of letters of which Locke was a part, but stresses the pre-social 
account of selfhood that arises out of Locke’s accounts of personal identity and private property (87-111).  
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the	countenance	by	blushing.’	Here	the	wrong	that	gives	rise	to	this	emotion	is	described	as	a	‘civill	dishonesty’.	That	is,	this	kind	of	shame	occurs	in	a	social	context,	and	the	words	Wilson	chooses	to	pick	out	its	cause	connote	that	civil	context	–	‘dishonesty’,	something	without	honour	or	credit,	and	‘fithinesse’,	something	not	necessarily	moral	at	all.	Here	the	causes	of	shame	might	simply	be	things	that	the	community	finds	unpleasant.	‘This	is’,	as	Wilson	elaborates,	‘shame	of	face’,	the	blushing	a	public,	even	communicative,	act,	a	revelation	to	others	of	a	breach	of	their	code.28	This	definition	of	shame,	then,	delineates	very	lightly	some	of	the	elements	that	constitute	reputation-shame.	On	the	other	hand,	Wilson	proffers	a	further,	and	slightly	more	fleshed	out,	definition	of	shame	that	lines	up	with	the	concept	of	guilt-shame	that	I	contend	was	especially	charged	at	this	time.	 ‘Shame’	is	also,	Wilson	continues,	that	 ‘trouble,	and	perturbation	of	minde	and	 conscience,	 beeing	 grieved	 and	 cast	 downe	 at	 the	 remembrance	 of	 sinne	 against	God.’29	Here	the	wrong	that	gives	rise	to	shame	is	a	real	moral	wrong.	It	is	sin,	and	it	is	the	basis	of	disquiet	without	anyone	else	looking,	or	knowing,	regardless	of	anyone	else’s	moral	codes.	The	only	external	gaze	you	might	feel	is	God’s,	his	eyes	boring	into	you,	or	indeed,	God	inside	you	–	in	the	court	of	conscience,	that	divinely	ordained	sense	of	what	is	right	and	wrong,	and	in	the	law	written	in	your	heart,	as	St.	Paul	put	it.30	Indeed,	as	Wilson	summarises,	‘this	is	Shame	of	conscience’,	that	nasty	feeling	that	occurs	far	from	the	public	 forum,	purely	on	 the	basis	of	private	 self-reflection,	 and	 that	 concerns	 true	iniquity.31	It	therefore	comes	very	close	to	the	concept	of	guilt,	that	is,	to	the	state	of	being	objectively	at	fault,	of	being	guilty	as	opposed	to	not	guilty,	that	state	that	gets	to	the	nub	of	one’s	moral	position	–	in	a	court	of	law,	in	truth	–	regardless	of	what	anyone	else	might	think.	Indeed,	by	the	sixth	edition	of	Wilson’s	Dictionarie	(1655),	he	is	connecting	guilt	and	 shame,	 defining	 ‘Guiltynesse’	 as	 ‘a	 sin	 or	 shamefull	 crime,	 making	 us	 guilty	 of	punishment’.32	To	be	guilty	is	to	have	committed	a	sin,	and	that	is,	by	definition,	shameful.	The	same	distinction	between	guilt-shame	and	reputation-shame	is	drawn	by	Samuel	von	Pufendorf	 in	 his	 De	 jure	 naturae	 et	 gentium	 (1672).	 There	 is	 one	 sort	 of	 shame,	 on	Pufendorf’s	account,	that	is	concerned	with	divinely	ordained	morality,	that	springs	up	in	
                                                             
28 Thomas Wilson, A Christian Dictionarie (London, 1612), 442. 
29 Wilson, A Christian Dictionarie, 442. 
30 The Bible, The Epistle of St Paul to The Romans, 2:15. 
31 Wilson, A Christian Dictionarie, 442. 
32 Wilson, A Complete Christian Dictionary (London, 1655), 255. 
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the	lonely	consideration	of	evil	deeds,	and	that	God	has	embedded	in	us	to	serve	‘for	a	Guard	and	Defence	to	Vertue,	 and	for	a	Bridle	 to	wicked	Designs’.33	However,	 there	 is	another	sort	of	shame,	he	goes	on	to	explain,	that	is	neutral	with	regard	to	morality,	and	is	motivated	by	anxiety	about	 the	opinions	of	other	people.	One	 form	of	 shame,	 then,	arises	‘from	the	pravity	of	Actions’,	and	the	other	‘from	any	Fact,	tho’	not	Morally	Evil,	which	we	think	will	lessen	our	Character	and	Esteem’.34		The	use	of	‘shame’	to	refer	directly	to,	and	even	synonymously	with,	sin	and	guilt,	appears	in	other	texts	of	the	period.	In	Popish	Glorying	in	Antiquitie	Turned	to	their	Shame,	an	anti-Catholic	 tract	by	William	Guild	published	 in	Aberdeen	 in	1626,	 the	close	 link	between	shame	and	guilt	is	signified	in	the	subtitle:	where-by	is	showne,	how	that	where-unto	they	
pretend	to	carrie	greatest	reverence,	they	wrong,	vilifie,	and	disgrace;	and	are	most	guiltie	
of	that	which	they	upbrayde	to	others.	The	shame	of	popery	is	the	sin	of	popery	(which	is	to	usurp	Scripture’s	fundamental	authority).	This	direct	conceptual	line	between	shame	and	 true	 wickedness	 is	 also	 evoked	 in	 the	 title	 of	 William	 Yonge’s	 hopping	 mad	denunciation	of	a	civil	war	revolutionary	in	a	publication	dated	1663:	England’s	Shame:	
or	the	unmasking	of	a	Politick	Atheist:	Being	a	Full	and	Faithful	Relation	of	the	life	and	death	
of	 that	 grand	 impostor	 Hugh	 Peters.	 While	 the	 ‘unmasking’	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 title	 is	intended	 in	 part	 to	 destroy	 Peters’	 reputation,	 and	 therefore	 speaks	 to	 the	 socially	orientated	concept	of	shame,	it	is	also	intended	simply	to	reveal,	to	uncover,	the	man’s	guilt.	His	shame,	that	is,	is	regicide.			Shame	at	one’s	sin,	experienced	in	the	sight	of	oneself	alone,	as	well	as	in	the	sight	of	God	who	sees	everything,	goes	back	to	that	foundation	story	so	resonant	in	the	first	half	of	the	seventeenth	century:	the	fall	of	mankind.35	Before	Eve	succumbed	to	the	temptations	of	the	 devil,	 and	Adam	 succumbed	 to	 the	 temptations	 of	 Eve,	man	 and	woman	 could	 be	naked,	and	become	‘one	flesh’,	and	–	says	Genesis	–	they	‘were	not	ashamed’.36	After	they	had	eaten	from	the	tree,	however,	 ‘the	eyes	of	them	both	were	opened,	and	they	knew	that	they	were	naked;	and	they	sewed	fig	leaves	together,	and	made	themselves	aprons’.37	This	is	not	the	shame	of	a	bad	reputation.	This	is	not	about	a	break	with	mere	convention.	
                                                             
33 Samuel von Pufendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, trans. Basil Kennett (Oxford, 1703), 16. 
34 Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, 16. 
35 See, for example, William Poole, Milton and the Idea of the Fall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
36 The Bible, Genesis, 2:25. 
37 The Bible, Genesis, 3:7. 
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Rather,	this	is	shame	at	one’s	sin,	and	disobedience	of	God’s	will,	which	is	the	only	true	moral	law.	Moreover,	the	shame	is	not	so	much	about	a	particular	action	(though	it	is	a	consequence	 of	 one)	 as	 about	 the	 self.	 Adam	 and	 Eve’s	 shame	 springs	 from	 the	 self-revelation	of	what	they	are.	Their	shame	is	inherent.	It	cannot	be	washed	away.		It	was	the	contribution	of	Augustine	to	turn	this	moment	in	paradise	into	the	doctrine	of	original	 sin	 and	 –	 I	want	 to	 argue	 –	 original	 shame,	 that	 then	 gripped	 so	much	 post-reformation	theology.	As	Augustine	explains	in	The	Confessions	about	the	lust	that	plagues	him	and	over	which	he	has	no	control:	‘it	was	not	I	who	brought	it	about,	but	the	sin	that	dwelt	within	me	as	penalty	for	that	other	sin	committed	with	greater	freedom;	for	I	was	a	son	of	Adam.’38	According	to	this	view,	sin	is	an	indelible	fact	of	the	human	condition,	and	shame	its	–	our	–	constant	shadow,	hovering	inescapably	in	solitary	consciousness.		This	shame	at	original	sin	 is	often	 focused	on	 its	original	site:	 the	naked	body	and	the	unruly	desire	it	both	represents	and	is	moved	by.	This	is	why,	as	Augustine	clarifies	in	
City	of	God,	the	relevant	‘members	…	should	be	called	pudenda	(‘parts	of	shame’)’.39	The	extent	to	which	this	shame	is	rooted	deep	in	human	nature	is	evident,	says	Augustine,	in	the	fact	that	‘all	peoples’	cover	their	sexual	organs;	‘barbarians’	even	keep	their	loin	cloths	on	 when	 they	 bathe,	 and	 ‘in	 the	 darkened	 solitudes	 of	 India’,	 naked	 philosophers	‘nevertheless	have	coverings	on	their	genitals’.40	Unlike	the	various	values	of	different	cultures,	 this	shame,	suggests	Augustine,	 is	a	universal	human	phenomenon.	The	tight	connection	between	nakedness	and	shame	reverberates	through	to	the	radical	Protestant	fervour	of	the	seventeenth	century.	It	is,	for	example,	already	apparent	in	the	title	of	the	1660	Quaker	tract,	A	Discovery	of	the	Priests	and	professors;	and	of	their	nakedness	and	
shame,	which	is	coming	upon	them,	from	their	High	Profession,	to	fall	as	mire	in	the	streets.	The	twinned	concepts	of	‘Nakedness	and	Shame’	proceed	to	echo	furiously	through	the	text	as	the	alleged	reality	of	the	false	church	is	stripped	bare.41	Shame	here	appears	as	synonymous	with	nakedness,	and	the	sin	it	represents.		
                                                             
38 Augustine, The Confessions, trans. Maria Boulding, ed. John E. Rotelle (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1997), 
202. 
39 Augustine, Concerning the City of God Against the Pagans, trans. Henry Bettenson (Harmondsworth: Penguin: 
1984), 578. 
40 Augustine, City of God, p. 579. 
41 William Simpson, A Discovery of the Priests and professors (London, 1660), e.g. 3 (twice), 4 (twice). 
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In	A	Mouzell	for	Melastomus	(1617),	an	intervention	in	the	English	querelle	des	femmes,		Rachel	Speght	picks	out	all	the	elements	of	guilt-shame.	It	was,	she	relates,	at	the	moment	of	Adam’s	fall	that	Eve’s	and	his	‘eyes	were	opened’.42	However,	they	are	not	opened	to	look	out	at	the	world,	but	rather	inward,	‘the	eies	of	their	mind	and	conscience’,	as	Speght	elaborates,	regarding	their	own	sinfulness.43	What	they	see	in	themselves	is	not	just	the	loss	of	 ‘that	 integritie,	which	 they	originally	had’,	 but	also	beings	 riven	by	 civil	war.44	Adam	 and	 Eve	 each	 felt	 ‘the	 rebellion	 and	 disobedience	 of	 their	 members	 in	 the	disordered	motions	of	their	own	corrupt	nature,	which	made	them	for	shame	to	cover	their	 nakednesse’.45	 Guilt-shame	 has	 sin	 –	 or	 guilt	 –	 as	 its	 intentional	 object,	 and	 it	involves	being	both	seen	by,	and	divided	from,	oneself.		It	 is	 worth	 noting	 how,	 in	 this	 shame	 at	 (original)	 sin,	 sin	 is	 figured	 as	 desire.	While	Augustine	 is	 preoccupied	 to	 the	 point	 of	 obsession	 with	 sexual	 desire,	 there	 is	 an	innumerable	array	of	desires,	or	cravings,	with	which	postlapsarian	mankind	is	poisoned:	the	lusts,	for	example,	for	‘vengeance’,	for	‘money’,	 ‘for	victory	at	any	price’,	and	as	the	Roman	 Empire	 testified,	 ‘the	 lust	 for	 domination’.46	 This	 association,	 indeed,	identification,	 of	 sin	 and	 desire	 is	 going	 strong	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 seventeenth	century.	Thomas	Wright,	for	example,	declares	in	The	Passions	of	the	Minde	(1601)	that	‘the	inordinate	motions	of	passions	…	are	thornie	briars	sprung	from	the	infected	roote	of	original	sinne’.47	Wright	presents	the	passions	not	only	as	obstacles	to	‘reason’,	but	to	‘vertue’	 too.48	 It	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 the	 Lutheran	 Pufendorf	 makes	 the	 same	connections.	Just	as	‘our	first	parents,	after	the	perfect	harmony	of	their	affections	was	disorder’d	and	impair’d	…	could	not	but	conceive	the	deepest	shame’,	so	‘our	affections’,	he	explains,	have	been	‘depraved	and	corrupted	by	the	Fall’.49	And	the	automatic	affective	consequence	of	this	corruption	is	the	‘passion	of	shame’.50	
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The	self	 that	 is	generated	 in	 this	guilt-shame	discourse	 is	 riven	 in	 two.	A	disobedient,	bisected	soul	is	at	once	the	cause	of	and	the	retribution	for	the	fall.	Desire	rebels	against	the	will,	or	against	reason	if	the	will	itself	corrupted.	The	body	wars	against	the	mind.	This	means	that	to	live	is	to	experience	conflict	within	oneself.	As	Augustine	puts	it,	man	is	‘disobedient	to	himself’,	so	that	‘his	very	mind	and	even	his	lower	element,	his	flesh,	do	not	submit	to	his	will’.51	The	result	of	Adam’s	pride	‘was	not	that	he	was	in	every	way	under	his	own	control,	but	 that	he	was	at	odds	with	himself’.52	Far	 from	winning	 the	freedom	he	longed	for,	Adam	sold	us	all	into	slavery.	And	it	is	Augustine’s	own	internal	battle	that	is	the	thrust	of	his	Confessions.	In	the	midst	of	his	struggle	to	turn	to	God,	he	articulates	a	split	self:	‘I	was	the	one	who	wanted	to	follow	that	course,	and	I	was	the	one	who	 wanted	 not	 to.	 I	 was	 the	 only	 one	 involved	 …	 I	 was	 at	 odds	 with	 myself,	 and	fragmenting	myself’.53	One	of	Augustine’s	deepest	readers,	Blaise	Pascal,	reiterates	the	division	that	is	at	the	core	of	sinful	selves.	‘Internal	war	in	human	beings	between	reason	and	passions’,	he	announces	non-propositionally	in	the	Pensées (written	between	1623	and	1662).	‘Having	both	they	cannot	be	without	war	…	So	they	are	always	divided	and	in	contradiction	with	themselves’.54	Echoing	Augustine’s	De	duabus	animabus,	he	exclaims	that	‘the	dual	nature	of	humanity	is	so	obvious	that	there	are	some	who	have	thought	we	have	 two	 souls’.55	 Pufendorf	 evokes	 this	 sense	 of	 persons	 alienated	 from	 themselves	when	he	describes	‘wretches’	as	‘their	own	punishers’.56	In	addition	to	the	conceptual	attributes	of	guilt-shame,	I	want	to	draw	attention	to	the	experience	of	this	moral	passion.	In	the	Confessions,	an	exploration	of	subjective	life	as	much	as	objective	theology,	Augustine	says	that	confronted	with	his	own	disgrace,	‘I	felt	myself	 loathsome’.57	 In	 the	 City	 of	 God,	 he	 describes	 the	 ‘feeling	 of	 shame’	 as	 a	‘punishment’.58	 It	 is	 supposed	 to	hurt.	One	of	Wilson’s	 elaborations	of	 the	meaning	of	‘Shame’	in	his	Dictionarie	is	‘Punishment	or	judgement	from	God,	which	makes	the	Sinner	ashamed’.59	 Pufendorf	 brings	out	 the	 punitively	 painful	 quality	 of	 this	 kind	of	 shame.	
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Adumbrating	the	‘horrours	and	tortures	of	mind,	which	are	the	constant	attendants	of	sin’,	 Basil	 Kennett,	 Pufendorf’s	 translator,	 quotes	 Thomas	 Creech’s	 translation	 of	Juvenal’s	Satire	13:	‘nor	Hell	it	self	can	find/A	fiercer	Torment	than	a	guilty	Mind’.60	There	is	no	redemption	in	this	life	for	a	particular	cast	of	Christian,	no	way	out	of	this	pain	of	guilt-shame.	It	is	like	a	cul-de-sac	of	negative	feeling.	Moreover,	to	be	pleased	with	oneself	is	a	sin.	Indeed,	this	is	pride,	‘the	start	of	every	sin’,	as	Augustine	tells	us.61	‘This	is	why’,	he	goes	on,	‘humility	is	highly	prized	in	the	City	of	God’.62	The	 intense	 displeasure	 of	 shame	manifests	 itself	 in	 the	 crushing,	 please-would-the-ground-swallow-me-up	experience	of	blushing.	Blushing	is,	as	John	Wilkins	states	in	An	
Essay	towards	a	real	character	and	a	philosophical	language	(1668),	‘the	outward	sign’	of	several	 ‘inward	passions’,	but	generally	when	our	 ‘countenance’	 is	discoloured	 ‘with	a	greater	 degree	 of	 redness	 than	 doth	 belong	 to	 the	 natural	 hue’,	 this	 is	due	 ‘chiefly	 to	Shame’.63	‘To	be	ashamed	is	taken’,	says	Wilson,	‘for	to	Blush’.64		What	is	striking	from	the	point	of	view	of	this	article	is	that	blushing	was	thought	by	some	to	apply	to	both	concepts	of	shame	that	I	am	delineating.	It	was	thought,	that	is,	to	apply	to	guilt-shame	as	well	as	reputation-shame,	with	which	 it	might	seem	more	obviously	associated.	One	might	think	of	blushing	primarily	as	a	response	to	being	caught	out	by	someone	else,	to	being	seen	by	the	other,	or	to	the	idea	of	being	seen	by	the	other,	as	in	Satre’s	 famous	 red-faced	 shudder	when	he	 fancies	he	hears	a	 footstep	while	he	peers	through	the	keyhole.65	Pufendorf,	however,	is	clear	that	blushing	also	occurs	as	a	result	of	pure	introspection.		Pufendorf,	we	remember,	explicitly	differentiates	between	the	two	concepts	of	shame.	Blushing,	he	says,	occurs	when	we	think	either	of	‘Evil	Deeds’	or	of	things	‘which	are	by	no	means	Morally	Evil’	but	which	would	harm	our	‘Reputation’.66	That	we	blush	in	the	former	 instance,	 at	 the	 mere	 thought	 or	 recollection	 of	 our	 turpitude,	 speaks	 to	 the	innateness,	the	extra-sociality,	of	guilt-shame.	The	mortifying	rush	to	the	cheeks	is	not	a	function	of	culture,	but	of	nature.	Pufendorf	elaborates	on	the	way	in	which	we	have	been	
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providentially	constructed	by	God	to	feel	the	burn	of	shame,	so	that	‘our	very	blood	seems	to	 have	 a	 natural	 sense	 of	 wicked	 deeds,	 which	 it	 expresses	 by	 spreading	 a	 sudden	redness	over	the	face’.67	Blushing,	which	seems	in	this	formulation	to	be	‘a	natural	effect	from	 an	 ill	 action’,	 is	 indeed	 an	 affective	 algorithm	 ‘that	 the	 most	 wise	 Creator	 has	implanted	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 men’	 that	 arises	 from	 ‘a	 Moral	 Quality’.68	 ‘The	 Passion	 of	shame’,	 embodied	 in	 our	 scorching	 skin,	 is	 triggered	 here	 by	 immorality.	 Our	 soul	apprehends	the	evil	within	and,	 ‘being	united	by	the	closest	ties	to	the	Body’,	the	body	responds.69	Here,	 shame	occurs	 in	a	deeply	personal,	private	 space.	 It	 is,	 according	to	Pufendorf,	 an	 automatic,	 pre-conscious,	 interiorised	 experience,	 veridical	 in	 a	 strong	sense,	and	requiring	no	spectator	other	than	ourselves	–	and	God.		The	internal	spectator	that	generates	guilt-shame	finds	its	home,	as	mentioned	above,	in	the	 conscience	 –	 that	 internal	 court,	 that	 internal	 space	 for	 the	 judgement	 of	 sin.	 As	Pufendorf	explains,	‘The	Judgment	pass’d	on	Moral	Actions	by	the	Understanding,	as	it	is	suppos’d	conscious	of	a	Law,	and	therefore	accountable	to	the	Law-giver,	is	commonly	call’d	Conscience’.70	Conscience	is	balanced	agonisingly	between	being	you,	or	a	part	of	you,	 and	 being	 God,	 and	 its	 judgement	 is	 not	 a	 cool,	 neutral	 sentence,	 but	 rather	 a	harrowing	ordeal.	Pufendorf	refers	to	the	‘gnawings	of	conscience,	and	the	want	of	quiet	and	security,	which	constantly	attend	evil	men’.71	This	recalls	Augustine’s	experience	of	battling	with	 his	 lusts:	 ‘My	 conscience	 gnawed	 away	 at	me	 in	 this	 fashion,	 and	 I	was	fiercely	shamed’.72	Augustine’s	visceral	description	of	being	eaten	up	inside	evokes	the	fervency	of	 the	spectator(s)	 involved	 in	guilt-shame.	He	remembers	hearing	his	 friend	recount	 the	 tale	 of	 his	 own	 conversion,	 and	 interjects:	 ‘but,	 Lord,	 even	while	 he	 [the	friend]	spoke	you	were	wrenching	me	back	toward	myself,	and	pulling	me	round	from	that	standpoint	behind	my	back	which	I	had	taken	to	avoid	looking	at	myself.	You	set	me	down	before	my	 face,	 forcing	me	 to	mark	 how	despicable	 I	was,	 how	misshapen	 and	begrimed,	 filthy	 and	 festering.	 I	 saw	 and	 shuddered’.73	 Here	 is	 the	 split	 self	 so	characteristic	 of	 guilt-shame	 appearing	 in	 a	 new	 guise,	 now	 intercut	 with	 God.	 This	
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‘shame	 of	 conscience’,	 as	Wilson	 calls	 it,	 occurs	 not	 through	 the	 optic	 of	 others,	 but	through	the	cracked	optic	of	our	selves	and	our	maker.74		The	final	point	I	want	to	make	about	guilt-shame	is	its	attitude	to	the	opinions	of	others.	It	 is	 not	 only	 the	 case	 that	 the	 internal,	 self-spectator	 matters,	 but	 that	 the	 external	spectator	does	not.	 Indeed,	 to	be	 concerned	with	one’s	 reputation	 is	 a	 sin	 in	 itself.	As	Montaigne	 says	 in	his	 scathing	essay	 ‘On	Glory’,	 ‘there	 is	 an	 indescribable	pleasure	 in	being	praised,	but	we	value	it	far	too	much’.75	He	goes	on:	‘I	am	not	so	much	worried	about	how	I	am	in	the	minds	of	other	men	as	how	I	am	 to	myself.	 I	want	 to	be	 enriched	by	me	not	by	borrowings	 from	others.	Those	outside	us	only	see	events	and	external	appearances:	anyone	can	put	on	a	good	outward	show	while	inside	he	is	full	of	fever	and	fright.	They	do	not	see	my	mind:	they	only	see	the	looks	on	my	face’.76	Here,	 value	 resides	 not	 in	 the	 praise	 or	 blame	 of	 others,	 but	 in	 the	 quiet,	 closeted,	cultivation	 of	 a	 good	 soul.	 Here,	 indeed,	 is	 the	 closed	 self,	 not	 drawn	 inward	 by	embarrassment,	by	an	acute	sensitivity	to	public	judgement,	as	Elias	would	have	it,	but	rather	precisely	by	a	rejection	of	that	sensitivity	as	a	worthy	sentiment.	Pascal	picks	up	on	our	morally	perilous	desire	to	live	through	the	eyes	of	others.	 ‘We	are	not	satisfied	with	the	 life	we	have	 in	ourselves	 in	our	own	being’,	he	declares,	 ‘we	want	to	 lead	an	imaginary	 life	 in	 the	minds	of	other	people,	 and	 so	we	make	an	effort	 to	 impress.	We	constantly	 strive	 to	embellish	and	preserve	our	 imaginary	being,	 and	neglect	 the	 real	one’.77	Pascal	rails	against	our	obsessive	embrace	of	the	false	self,	constructed	for	others,	at	the	expense	of	the	real,	internal	self.	‘Vanity’	–	‘the	desire	to	be	esteemed	by	those	in	whose	company	one	is’	–	hollows	us	out,	so	that	we	come	to	care	nothing	for	true	virtue,	for	generosity,	or	loyalty,	but	instead	chase	its	image,	its	mere	simulacrum,	even	to	the	bitter	end.	We	have	returned	to	pride,	albeit	a	different	species.	We	saw	it	criticised	as	grotesque	 self-regard.	 It	 now	 re-emerges	 as	 pleasure	 at	 the	 admiration	 of	 others.	 As	Pascal	mourns,	‘pride	takes	hold	of	us	so	naturally	in	the	midst	of	all	our	wretchedness,	errors,	 etc.,	 that	we	 even	 lose	 our	 lives	 joyfully,	 provided	people	 talk	 about	 it’.78	 This	
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manic	concern	for	what	other	people	think	of	us	is	part	of	the	sin	that	shames	us.	As	St.	Matthew	enjoins:	‘Take	heed	that	ye	do	not	your	alms	before	men,	to	be	seen	of	them’.	This	injunction	‘not	to	sound	a	trumpet	before	thee’	in	order	to	garner	the	‘glory	of	men’	runs	deep	in	the	Christian	tradition.79	The	hunger	in	a	man	after	‘others	praises’	is	‘Pride’,	explains	Wright,	whereby	‘self-love	and	vanity	possesse	the	best	tenement	of	his	heart’.80	Bound	up	with	the	concept	of	guilt-shame,	then,	is	the	sin	of	vainglory	and	an	injunction	
not	to	care	what	other	people	think	of	you.	Or	to	put	 it	another	way,	guilt-shame	here	unfolds	itself	in	direct	opposition	to	reputation-shame,	to	which	I	will	shortly	turn.		But	 first	 to	 recap:	 the	 kind	 of	 shame	 that	 I	 have	 sketched	 in	 this	 section	 abjures	 and	retreats	 from	 the	 limelight.	 It	 looks	 inward,	 at	 the	 sin	 that	 ferments	 insistently	 in	our	souls,	that	moves	our	bodies	in	ways	we	cannot	control.	We	feel	it	on	our	own;	we	feel	it	even	when	our	eyes	are	closed.	And	if	we	feel	other	eyes	on	us,	they	tend	to	be	those	of	God.	This	 is	a	shame	that	baulks	at	 the	desires	 that	drive	us,	 thereby	dividing	us	 from	ourselves	 and	 hampering	 our	 agency.	 It	 is,	 I	 want	 to	 suggest,	 the	 antecedent	 of	 the	negative	 concept	of	 shame	 that,	more	or	 less	slipped	 from	 its	Christian	moorings	and	doubtless	undergoing	 further	 and	overlapping	 histories,	 remains	 in	 use	 today:	 shame	about	 some	 perceived	 unworthiness,	 or	 wrong,	 or	 flaw,	 in	 ourselves,	 such	 as	masturbation	or	menstruation	–	shame	that	diminishes	and	isolates	us,	and	is	no	good	at	all.	 III	Sometime	in	the	seventeenth	century,	it	seems	to	me	that	another	concept	of	shame,	or	at	 least	 a	 new	 configuration	 of	 a	 concept	 that	 had	 been	 in	 use	 since	 antiquity,	 was	expressed.	This	alternative	concept	is	a	descendant	of	‘shame’	as	it	had	been	defined	by	Aristotle,	‘as	a	kind	of	fear	of	dishonour’.81	Given	a	new	lease	of	life	by	participants	in	the	developing	 public	 sphere,	 it	 thrived	 into	 the	 eighteenth	 century.	 If	 we	 think	 back	 to	Wilson’s	Christian	Dictionarie	 of	 1612,	we	 remember	 that	 he	 proffered	 two	 concepts,	categorically	distinguishing	between	them:	 ‘an	affection	which	springeth,	by	reason	of	some	civill	dishonesty	or	filfthinesse’,	which	I	have	called	reputation-shame,	and	‘trouble,	
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and	perturbation	of	minde	and	conscience’,	which	I	have	called	guilt-shame	and	which	I	have	argued	was	having	quite	a	moment	in	the	heat	of	Protestantism.82	However,	if	we	turn	to	a	dictionary	first	published	in	1702,	John	Kersey’s	New	English	Dictionary,	guilt-shame	has	fallen	away	from	the	page,	apparently	edged	out	by	the	alternative,	socially-oriented	concept.		‘To	shame’,	Kersey	explains,	means	‘put	to	shame	or	disgrace.’	‘Shameful’,	he	elaborates,	means	 ‘infamous	or	disgracefull’.83	 Immediately,	we	can	see	that	 the	concept	has	spun	outward	 to	 face	 the	world.	 Rather	 than	 the	 bitter	 fruit	 of	 solitary	 experience,	 it	 here	appears	as	the	product	of	social	infamy	and	disgrace.	Significantly,	too,	Kersey	adds	the	antonym	of	‘Shamelessness’	to	his	lexicon:	‘a	being	shameless	void	of	shame	or	impudent’.	The	introduction	of	shamelessness	as	the	opposite	of	shame	marks	a	further	distinction	in	 the	 configuration	of	 the	 concept.	 It	 inaugurates,	or	resurrects,	 the	 idea	of	 shame	as	something	desirable,	rather	than	something	undesirable	that	it	would	have	been	better	never	to	know,	a	hateful	thing	that	was	unfamiliar	to	Eve	and	Adam	in	the	garden.	The	concept	of	shamelessness,	and	indeed	the	possibility	of	it,	gestures	towards	shame	as	a	form	of	 virtue,	 the	 social	 glue	 that	 regulates	 communities,	 its	 absence	 rather	 than	 its	presence	now	a	horror.		Interestingly,	 ‘shame’	 does	 not	 feature	 at	 all	 as	 a	 lexical	 item	 in	 Edward	 Phillips’s	dictionary	when	it	is	first	published	in	1658.	It	is	only	in	the	sixth	edition	of	1706	of	The	
New	World	 of	Words:	 Or,	 Universal	 English	Dictionary	 that	 the	 term	 first	 appears,	 and	when	it	does,	it	is	characterised	exclusively	as	a	social	phenomenon.	While	reputation-shame	had	long	been	integral	to	various	discourses,	it	is	striking	that	it	should	arrive	in	this	way	in	this	instance	at	the	dawn	of	the	eighteenth	century.	Phillips	defines	‘Shame’	as	‘an	uneasiness	of	the	mind,	upon	account	of	having	done	something	which	is	unseemly,	or	that	tends	to	lessen	one’s	esteem	among	others;	also	disgrace	or	reproach’.84	Note	here	not	only	the	other-directed	character	of	the	emotion,	but	also	its	dialogical	component	–	others	shame	me,	just	as	I	might	shame,	or	‘reproach’,	them.	By	the	time	we	get	to	Samuel	Johnson’s	A	Dictionary	of	the	English	Language,	published	in	1755,	guilt-shame	has	been	eclipsed	 as	 a	 species	 of	 shame.	 ‘Shame’,	 states	 Johnson,	 ‘1.	 The	 passion	 felt	 when	
                                                             
82 Wilson, A Christian Dictionarie, 442. 
83 John Kersey, A New English Dictionary, Or a Compleat Collection of the Most Proper and Significant Words 
Commonly Used in the Language (London, 1702), n.p. 
84 Edward Phillips, The New World of Words: Or, Universal English Dictionary (London, 1706), n.p.  
   
 
21 
 
reputation	is	supposed	to	be	lost	…	2.	The	cause	or	reason	of	shame;	disgrace;	ignominy	…	3.	Reproach’.	Moreover,	underneath	we	find	the	following	entry:	‘Shameless.	Wanting	shame;	 wanting	 modesty;	 impudent;	 frontless;	 immodest;	 audacious’.85	 Pithily	 and	unambiguously,	 then,	 shame	 appears	 here	 as	 concerned	 with	 reputation	 and	communication.	And,	again,	the	light	has	changed.	Gone	are	the	thunderous	clouds;	now	shame	is	something	to	be	wished	for.	If	we	turn	to	Smith’s	The	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments	first	published	four	years	later	in	1759,	we	meet	the	same	insistence	that	‘shame’	per	se	presupposes	‘the	idea	of	some	other	being’	and	therefore	is	only	conceivable,	and	only	exists,	in	society.86		Top	of	the	list	of	authors	that	Johnson	cites	for	usages	of	the	term	‘shame’	is	Locke.87	This	appears	to	me	as	no	accident	because	it	is	in	Locke	that	we	find	one	of	the	most	pivotal	and	strident	accounts	of	the	reputation-shame	that	I	see	being	sturdily	refreshed	during	this	period.	In	An	Essay	concerning	Human	Understanding,	first	published	in	1689,	Locke	announces	that	there	are	three	species	of	moral	law,	that	is,	three	different	sets	of	rules	by	which	human	beings	regulate	their	actions.	The	first	is	God’s	law,	the	breach	of	which	is	sin.	The	second	 is	 the	civil	 law.	The	third	 is	 ‘The	Law	of	Opinion	or	Reputation’,	 the	particular	 customs	 and	 fashions	which	obtain	 in	 particular	 cultures,	 and	which	 differ	from	place	to	place.	For	a	law	to	count	as	a	law,	it	must	have	a	means	of	‘enforcement’.88	It	must,	that	is,	have	rewards	and	punishments	attached	to	it,	otherwise	it	would	be	just	words.	 One	 might	 think	 that	 God’s	 law,	 with	 its	 sanctions	 of	 eternal	 fire	 and	 bliss	forevermore,	or	the	civil	law,	with	the	prospect	of	the	hangman’s	noose,	would	press	most	heavily	on	our	wills.	It	turns	out,	however,	that	it	is	the	law	of	reputation,	the	breach	of	which	 brings	 shame,	 and	 the	 observance	 praise,	 that	 motivates	 us	 most	 powerfully.	Acknowledging	 the	 shock	 that	 this	 assessment	of	human	motivation	might	give	 to	his	readers,	Locke	rebounds	with	the	claim	that	those	who	imagine	that	‘commendation	and	disgrace’	are	not	‘strong	motives	on	men’	are	themselves	‘little	skill’d	in	the	nature,	or	history	of	mankind:	the	greatest	part	whereof	he	shall	find	to	govern	themselves	chiefly,	if	not	solely,	by	this	 law	of	 fashion’.89	 I	will	quote	Locke’s	explanation	 for	 this	view	at	
                                                             
85 Samuel Johnson, Dictionary of the English Language, 2 vols., London, 1755, n.p. 
86 Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D.D. Raphael and A.L. Macfie, Indianapolis, 1982, p. 193. 
87 Samuel Johnson, A Dictionary of the English Language, 2 vols. (London, 1755), n.p. 
88 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 
352. For an excellent analysis of Locke on reputation, see Tim Stuart-Buttle, ‘‘A Burthen too Heavy for Humane 
Sufferance’: Locke on Reputation’, History of Political Thought 38 (2017), 644-80.  
89 Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 356-7. 
   
 
22 
 
length	because	it	gives	a	sense	of	the	phenomenological	texture	and	power	of	reputation-shame.	Few	men,	says	Locke,	 ‘seriously	reflect	on’	the	consequences	of	sin,	and	people	think	they	can	evade	the	surveillance	of	the	state:		‘But	no	man	scapes	the	punishment	of	their	censure	and	dislike,	who	offends	against	 the	 fashion	 and	 opinion	 of	 the	 company	 he	 keeps,	 and	 would	recommend	 himself	 to.	 Nor	 is	 there	 one	 of	 ten	 thousand,	 who	 is	 stiff	 and	insensible	enough,	to	bear	up	under	the	constant	dislike,	and	condemnation	of	his	 own	 club.	 He	 must	 be	 of	 a	 strange,	 and	 unusual	 constitution,	 who	 can	content	 himself,	 to	 live	 in	 constant	 disgrace	 and	 disrepute	 with	 his	 own	particular	society	…	no	body,	that	has	the	least	thought,	or	sense	of	a	man	about	him,	 can	 live	 in	 society,	 under	 the	 constant	 dislike,	 and	 ill	 opinion	 of	 his	familiars,	and	those	he	converses	with.	This	is	a	burthen	too	heavy	for	human	sufferance:	and	he	must	be	made	up	of	irreconcilable	contradictions,	who	can	take	pleasure	in	company,	and	yet	be	insensible	of	contempt	and	disgrace	from	his	companions.’90		For	Locke,	shame	clearly	trumps	guilt	in	explaining	human	motivation.	In	his	view,	people	do	not	care	about	the	pricks	of	conscience	so	much	as	the	shame	of	ostracism.	They	are	no	 longer	 looking	down	into	 the	well	of	sin,	but	 rather	out	at	 their	peers	and	betters.	Shame	has	shifted	from	having	a	fundamentally	introspective	inspiration	to	a	social	one.		This	kind	of	shame,	especially	with	regard	to	sexual	behaviour,	has	often	been	thought	of	by	historians	in	asymmetrical	gendered	terms	–	as	something	more	swiftly	imposed,	and	more	pressingly	felt,	by	women	than	by	men.91	Certainly,	the	author	of	Her	Protection	for	
Women	(1589),	who	went	by	the	name	of	Jane	Anger,	raged	against	the	fact	that	a	woman	‘is	most	certain	to	be	bereaved	of	her	good	name,	if	there	be	any	small	cause	of	suspicion’	of	 infidelity.92	 Indicating	 the	more	 general	 fragility	 of,	 and	 penetrating	 preoccupation	with	a	woman’s	honour,	the	author	of	the	explosive	An	Essay	in	Defence	of	the	Female	Sex	
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(1696)	 explained	 that	 she	wanted	 to	 be	 anonymous	 on	 account	 ‘of	 the	 tenderness	 of	reputation	 in	 our	 sex’.93	 A	 woman’s	 name	 was	 so	 brittle	 that	 this	 particular	 woman	decided	to	protect	it	by	hiding	it	altogether.	We	now	know	that	this	woman	was	Judith	Drake.	She,	like	Anger	before	her,	gestured	at	the	long-standing,	and	negatively	charged,	concentration	on	a	woman’s	shame.		What	Locke	and	others	demonstrate	is	not	only	the	wider	scope	of	social	shame,	but	also	the	particular,	positively	charged	form	of	the	concept,	appropriated	for	male	advantage,	that	walked	taller	as	the	seventeenth	century	wore	on.	Lockean	shame	or	‘the	uneasiness	of	the	mind’	at	the	thought	of	acting	in	such	a	way	that	will	 ‘lessen	the	valued	esteem,	which	others	have	for	us’,	need	not	torment	us	irredeemably.94	Anxiety	about	being	liked	does	not	have	to	stagnate	in	us	and	infiltrate	our	souls	with	self-loathing,	but	can	flow	into	the	pleasure	of	actually	being	liked.	There	is	in	this	alternative	discourse	of	shame,	the	prospect	of	circumventing	it	and	even,	especially	if	you	are	lucky	enough	to	be	born	a	gentleman,	 of	 recovery	 from	 it.	 Reputation-shame	 has	 mobility	 built	 into	 it;	 the	unpleasant	 and	 lonely	 sensation	 of	 real	 or	 imagined	 shame	 is	 transmutable	 into	 the	pleasure	of	glory	and	companionship,	and	within	this	the	possibility	of	a	flourishing	and,	
pace	Elias	et	al.,	an	open	self.	Indeed,	an	openness	to	others,	an	interest	in	their	approval,	is	for	Locke,	integral	to	what	it	means	to	human,	without	which	one	cannot	be	said,	to	return	to	the	above	quotation,	to	have	even	the	barest	‘sense	of	a	man	about	him’.	As	Locke	suggests,	it	is	not	–	or	not	exclusively	nor	necessarily	–	sin	that	is	the	object	of	reputation-shame,	 but	 rather	 the	 conventional	 codes	 of	 one’s	 particular	 culture	 or	community.	 These	 might	 not	 be	 moral,	 but	 simply	 things	 that	 bring	 social	 disgrace.	Thomas	Hobbes,	 for	example,	who	has	an	arguably	dismissive,	or	at	 least	 ambivalent,	attitude	 to	 sin	 per	 se,	 and	 is	 a	 great	 champion	 of	 reputation-shame,	 avoids	 all	moral	connotations	in	his	formal	definition	of	‘shame’.	It	is,	he	says	in	Leviathan	(1651),	‘griefe,	for	the	discovery	of	defect	of	ability	…	the	passion	that	discovereth	it	selfe	in	blushing;	and	 consisteth	 in	 the	 apprehension	 of	 some	 thing	 dishonourable’.95	 In	 A	 Treatise	 of	
Human	Nature	(1739),	Hume,	so	often	reminiscent	of	Hobbes,	right	down	to	the	wryness,	lists	some	of	 the	possible	objects	of	pride	and	humility	 in	a	catalogue	of	unmistakable	
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moral	neutrality:	‘our	country,	family,	children,	relations,	riches,	houses,	gardens,	horses,	dogs,	cloaths’.96	In	Hobbes’	comment	we	re-encounter	the	blush,	the	sign	we	have	already	met,	somewhat	surprisingly,	of	guilt-shame,	now	reappearing	as	 the	sign	of	reputation-shame.	Here	 it	manifests	less	unexpectedly	as	prompted	by	the	(albeit	imagined)	gaze	of	the	other.	For	Francis	Bacon,	in	his	Sylva	Sylvarum	(1627),	the	two	effects	of	‘Shame’	are	‘1.	blushing;	and	2.	a	downcast	look’,	the	latter	because	one	‘cannot	endure	to	look	stedfastly	upon’	others,	to	meet	the	others’	eyes.97	Blushing	in	this	context	is	intricately	bound	up	with	the	public	 gaze.	 It	 is	 the	 outward	 mark	 of	 the	 passion,	 an	 excruciatingly,	 involuntarily,	communicative	act,	whereby	we	become	‘Shame-faced’,	exhibiting	‘Shame-facedness’,	to	draw	now	on	Kersey’s	 inventory	of	shame-related	words.98	To	be	ashamed	 is	not	 just	literally	to	go	red	in	the	face,	but	metaphorically	to	lose	face	in	one’s	community.	What	is	especially	noteworthy	about	blushing	in	relation	to	reputation-shame	is	not	only	the	way	in	which	blushing	is	figured	as	morally	neutral,	resulting	from	some	defect,	any	defect,	 of	 which	 the	 community	 disapproves,	 but	 also	 the	 way	 in	 which	 one	 might	sometimes	blush	 for	 things	that	are	not	one’s	 fault,	and,	conversely,	might	not	always	blush	for	things	that	are.	As	Locke	says,	‘Shame	…	has	not	always	blushing	accompanying	it’,	gesturing	to	the	uncertain,	even	non-veridical,	nature	of	the	sign.99	Nicolas	Coeffeteau,	whose	Tableau	 des	 passions	 humaines	 (1620)	was	 almost	 immediately	 translated	 into	English	and	published	in	London	in	1621,	and	who	describes	‘shame’	as	‘a	griefe	and	a	confusion,	which	growes	from	the	apprehension	of	some	crosses,	which	may	make	man	infamous’,	goes	on	to	enumerate	a	broad	array	of	things	that	might	make	a	man	blush,	including	those	things	over	which	he	has	no	control.100	‘Men	blush’,	for	example,	‘when	as	they	are	forced	to	do	or	suffer	things’.101	‘Shame	riseth’,	Coeffeteau	elaborates,	‘from	a	beleefe	which	wee	have	to	bee	wounded	in	our	reputation’	–	regardless	of	whether	the	disgrace	 is	 justified	 or	 morally	 significant.102	 Pufendorf,	 whom	 we	 remember	
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distinguishes	between	two	kinds	of	shame	that	map	onto	the	distinction	I	am	proposing,	is	 clear	 that	 the	 second	 kind,	 that	 arises	 from	 things	which	would	 be	 ‘hurtful	 to	 our	reputation’,	include	those	things	‘which	are	not	endued	with	any	moral	quality’.	So	it	is,	he	enlarges,	that	‘we	see	many	persons	who	cannot	forbear	blushing	at	their	lameness,	or	baldness	…	at	some	particular	diseases,	at	poverty,	bad	cloaths,	at	faultless	ignorance,	or	at	harmless	mistake’.103	Blushes,	then,	and	the	reputation-shame	of	which	they	are	so	often	the	sign,	appear	variously	untethered	–	from	morality,	from	responsibility,	and	even	from	 each	 other.	 And	 the	 intensity	 of	 reputation-shame	 finds	 its	 origins	 in	 the	‘extraordinary	pleasure’,	as	Pufendorf	puts	it,	that	human	beings	take	in	being	thought	well	of	by	their	neighbours.104	The	fixation	with	the	admiration	of	others	that	underpins	reputation-shame	is	not	always	celebrated	by	the	authors	that	spell	it	out.	Their	criticism	brings	them	into	lockstep	with	the	 proponents	 of	 guilt-shame	 whom	 we	 saw	 castigate	 people	 for	 vanity	 and	 pride.	Pufendorf	is	a	case	in	point,	as	one	might	have	predicted.	For	him,	fervent	concern	for	one’s	 reputation	 is	 a	vice	 in	 itself,	 powered	by	 the	 fact	 that	 ‘man	 is	 a	most	ambitious	creature,	 and	highly	 conceited	of	his	own	excellency’,	who	 likes	nothing	more	 than	 to	‘brag,	 and	 swell,	 and	 carry	 himself	 above	 the	 dimensions	 of	 his	 neighbours’.105	Pufendorf’s	 sideswiping	 at	 reputation-shame	 is	 evident	 not	 only	 in	 his	 substantive	disparagement	but	also	in	the	formal	way	in	which	he	structures	his	presentation	of	the	two	 concepts	 of	 shame.	 Shame	 at	 immorality,	 what	 I	 have	 called	 guilt-shame,	 which	rushes	 upon	 us	 even	 in	 isolation,	 is	 introduced	 first	 –	 as	 true	 shame,	 as	 it	 were.	Reputation-shame	 is	 then	 brought	 in	 secondarily,	 as	 an	 aside.	 ‘Besides,	 we	 ought	 to	observe,	 that	 shame	 do’s	 not	 only	 arise	 from	 the	 pravity	 of	 actions’,	 says	 Pufendorf,	introducing	 reputation-shame	 as	 the	 lesser	 relative.	 This	 vision	 of	 guilt-shame	 as	 the	dominant,	proper	 form	of	 the	passion,	overshadowing	and	belittling	reputation-shame	seems	emblematic	of	 the	 relative	 supremacy	of	 guilt-shame	 in	a	particular	stratum	of	post-Reformation	discourse.	But	it	also	speaks	of	a	shift	in	the	discourse,	of	a	hint	of	the	rejuvenation	of	reputation-shame	as	a	vital	and	distinct	concept	in	moral	discourse.		
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While	Locke	moves	reputation-shame	centre-stage,	as	we	have	seen,	we	can	still	discern	in	him	echoes	of	Pufendorfian	denunciation.	It	is	Locke’s	ambivalence	about	reputation-shame,	coupled	with	his	presentation	of	it	as	the	ultimate	motivator,	that	makes	him	a	pivotal	figure	in	my	narrative.	A	big	fan	of	Pufendorf	as	well	as	sincerely	Christian,	Locke	would	like	it	if	men	cared	more	about	their	duties	to	God	rather	than	their	reputations,	about	sin	rather	than	disgrace.	Both	his	discomfort	and	his	long-term	preoccupation	with	the	 law	of	 fashion	are	evident	 if	 one	 looks	at	 an	early	manuscript	 from	1675	entitled	‘Philanthropy	 or	 The	 Christian	 Philosophers’.	 There	 he	 bemoans	 ‘Example	 &	 Fashion	being	the	great	Governours	of	this	world’.106	‘The	Question’,	he	goes	on,	that	‘every	man	ought	to	aske	in	all	things	he	doth	…	is,	how	is	this	acceptable	to	God?’	But	instead,	most	of	us,	problematically,	wonder	‘how	will	this	rend[er]	me	to	my	company’?	The	problem	with	the	law	of	reputation	 is	compounded	 insofar	as	Locke	thinks,	at	 least	when	he	 is	deep	 in	 his	 destructive,	 anti-innatist	 polemic	 in	 Book	 I	 of	 the	 Essay,	 that	 the	 law	 of	reputation	often	diverges	 from	the	 law	of	nature,	or	 true	morality.	As	he	states	 in	 the	
Essay,	 the	 divine	 law	 ‘is	 the	 only	 true	 touchstone	 of	moral	 rectitude’.107	 The	 customs	across	 different	 countries	 and	 different	 times,	 however,	 vary	 wildly	 and	 atrociously.	‘There	 are	 places’,	 announces	 Locke,	 ‘where	 they	 eat	 their	 own	 children’,	 and	 others	where	‘they	have	not	so	much	as	a	name	for	God’.108		However,	in	other	moods,	Locke	suggests	that	the	law	of	reputation	might	not	be	such	a	bad	thing.	When	he	comes,	now	in	hedonic	and	constructive	mode,	in	Book	II	to	explain	how	we	actually	come	by	moral	ideas,	he	explains	that	‘since	nothing	can	be	more	natural,	than	 to	 encourage	 with	 esteem	 and	 reputation	 that,	 wherein	 every	 one	 finds	 his	advantage;	and	to	blame	and	discountenance	the	contrary;	 ’tis	no	wonder,	that	esteem	and	discredit,	virtue	and	vice,	should	in	great	measure	every-where	correspond	with	the	unchangeable	rule	of	right	and	wrong,	which	the	law	of	God	hath	established’.109	Since	God	wants	mankind	to	be	preserved,	and	each	man	wants	preservation	for	himself,	God	and	 man	 recoiling	 as	 one	 at	 murder	 or	 theft,	 for	 example,	 the	 laws	 of	 nature	 and	reputation	tend	to	run	in	parallel.	In	this	way	the	law	of	reputation	might	be	seen	as	doing	God’s	work.	Moreover,	sin	figures	differently	in	Locke	than	it	does	in	Pufendorf.	For	the	
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Englishman,	sin	is	not	woven	irrevocably	into	our	beings	in	such	a	way	as	to	make	being	alive	a	state	of	necessary	shamefulness.	Instead,	Locke	is	sceptical	about	the	very	idea	of	original	 sin.110	 It	 is	 no	 wonder,	 then,	 that	 no	 longer	 dragged	 down	 by	 an	 inevitably	revolting	self,	he	can	turn	his	attention	to	the	alternative,	and	 lighter,	sense	of	shame.	Indeed,	 it	 seems	 to	 me	 very	 relevant	 that	 the	 decline	 of	 guilt-shame	 and	 the	 rise	 of	reputation-shame	 for	which	 I	 am	 arguing	 coincide	 not	 only	with	 new	kinds	 of	 public	spheres,	but	also	with	the	arrival	of	natural	religion.	This	shame	that	looks	out,	rather	than	in,	that	is	unburdened	by	the	weight	of	(original)	sin,	tends	to	be	part	of	a	positive,	uplifting	discourse.	The	motor	of	reputation-shame	is	fuelled	by	the	pleasure	of	a	good	reputation,	and	drives	the	invention	of	moral	fibre.	As	Wilkins	says,	‘our	names,	and	the	esteem	we	have	amongst	good	men’	are	‘instruments	of	 vertue’.111	While	 the	 concept	of	 guilt-shame	outlined	above	was	of	 course	 in	part	 a	bridle	 to	sin,	and	a	spur	to	duty,	 there	was	no	way	of	avoiding	original	sin,	no	way	of	escaping,	that	is,	the	sinful	feelings	of	uncontrollable	desire.	Nor	was	the	bridle	to	sinful	actions	a	pleasant	experience.	It	was	only	ever	punitive.	Of	course,	reputation-shame	per	
se	 is	 not	 pleasant	 either,	 but	 it	 readily	 holds	 out	 the	 prospect	 of	 pleasure,	 or	 of	 the	transformation	 of	 itself	 into	 pleasure	 in	 the	 warm	 embrace	 of	 one’s	 community.	Reputation-shame	 is	 just	 round	 the	 corner	 from	glory.	Under	his	 enumeration	of	 ‘The	Instruments	 of	 Vertue’,	 Wilkins	 lists	 a	 pair	 of	 options	 –	 ‘REPUTATION,	 credit,	countenance,	 applause,	 name,	 honour,	 vogue,	 report,	 fame	 …	 glory,	 renown’,	 and	‘INFAMY,	disgrace,	discredit,	dishonour	…	shame,	 ignominy,	stein’.	These	counterparts	are	as	much	in	dialogue	with	each	other	as	they	are	in	opposition,	informing	each	other	as	two	sides	of	the	same	coin	in	the	generation	of	virtue.	Disgrace	is	a	flip	of	the	coin	to	credit.	With	our	eyes	as	fixed	on	the	furrowed	brows	as	on	the	applause	we	will	win	the	‘goods	of	fortune’.112	Hobbes	makes	the	intimacy	of	shame	and	glory	explicit:	‘shame’,	he	says,	is	a	‘signe	of	the	love	of	good	reputation;	and	commendable’,	before	adding	wryly	(and	twisting	Aristotle)	that	it	ceases	to	be	commendable	‘in	old	men’,	‘because	it	comes	too	late’.113	In	the	Natural	History	of	the	Passions	 (1674),	an	anonymous	text	generally	attributed	to	Walter	Charleton,	‘shame’	is	explicitly	linked	to	‘glory’	as	a	sister	virtue,	both	
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are	 called	 ‘good	 and	 laudable’,	 and	 contrasted	 with	 ‘vicious	 insensibility	 of	 honor’	 –	evoking	the	good	of	shame,	and	the	correspondent	horror	of	shamelessness,	the	traces	of	which	remain	in	our	lexicon.114	And	by	1700,	in	William	Ayloffe’s	The	Government	of	the	
Passions	According	to	the	Rules	of	Reason	and	Religion,	‘Shame’	is	being	described	as	the	‘innocent	passion’	that	protects	all	the	virtues’.115	This	is	shame	played	in	a	major	key,	the	chords	of	which	were	sounding	with	renewed	vigour	 towards	 the	end	of	 the	 seventeenth	 century.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 context	 that	 the	more	famous	melodies	of	 the	eighteenth	century	make	sense.	Perhaps	the	most	arresting	of	these	was	performed	by	Bernard	Mandeville	in	The	Fable	of	the	Bees	(1714),	which	set	forth	the	full	moral	and	social	potential	of	‘the	notions	of	honour	and	shame’.	Mandeville	posited	that	by	‘making	use	of	this	bewitching	engine’,	naturally	self-interested	human	beings	might	be	 induced	to	work	towards	the	public	good.116	Hume’s	positive	spin	on	reputation,	and	the	discursive	complex	of	vanity	and	self-enjoyment	of	which	it	is	a	part,	hoves	 memorably	 into	 view	 in	 An	 Enquiry	 Concerning	 the	 Principles	 of	 Morals,	 first	published	in	1751.	There,	attacking	‘superstition	and	false	religion’,	he	mocks	‘celibacy,	fasting,	penance,	mortification,	self-denial,	humility,	silence,	solitude,	and	the	whole	train	of	monkish	virtues’.117	‘Pride’,	as	Hume	had	already	explained	in	the	Treatise,	is	wrongly	thought	of	as	a	‘vice’,	and	humility	as	a	‘virtue’,	a	view	perpetuated	by	‘the	schools	and	pulpit’.118	 Undoubtedly,	 Hume	 stood	 apart	 from	many	 of	 the	 conventional	moral	 and	religions	opinions	of	his	day,	and	Mandeville	was	a	satirist.	Nonetheless,	in	valorising,	or	harnessing,	the	power	of	shame,	and	its	intimate	partner	glory,	these	authors	present	a	different	kind	of	music	to	the	strains	we	heard	in	Augustine.		The	idea	of	reputation-shame,	and	the	endorsement	of	it,	has	deep	roots.	The	deepest	of	these	go	back	to	antiquity,	as	in	Aristotle,	who	describes	it	as	a	‘quasi-virtue’	(only	‘quasi’	because	 it	 is	 passion	 rather	 than	 ‘a	 state	 of	 character’).119	 As	 Locke	 says,	 the	 law	 of	
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reputation	 can	be	 found	 in	 ‘the	heathen	philosophers’.120	Perhaps	 the	most	 important	figure	here	for	early	modern	readers	was	Cicero,	whose	De	Officiis	was	almost	a	bible,	and	who	envisaged	a	world	in	which	honour	and	the	good	might	go	happily	hand	in	hand.	In	Cicero’s	 organic	 account	 of	 the	 dawn	 of	 civilisation,	 he	 explains	 how	 men	 gathered	together	 in	 cities,	 and	 how	 laws	 and	 justice	were	 developed,	 which	 in	 turn	 ‘led	 to	 a	softening	of	men’s	spirits	and	a	sense	of	shame’.121	This	is	a	kind	of	shame	that	civilises,	tempering	and	mollifying	our	brutal	inclinations	–	that	is	to	say,	exactly	the	opposite	of	the	kind	of	force	that	the	tenacious	shame	to	guilt	narrative	suggests,	according	to	which	brutality	is	replaced	by	civility.	Shame	here	enables	us	not	only	to	stay	alive,	but	to	live	together	in	a	delicate	and	respectful	way.	Cicero	locates	‘a	sense	of	shame’	alongside	the	duty	to	‘be	mindful	of	the	way	we	behave	towards	men’,	and	lumps	both	these	under	the	headings	not	only	of	what	is	‘honourable’,	but	of	‘virtue’	too	–	which	two	categories	are	themselves	 continuous	 with	 each	 other.122	 And	 sure	 enough,	 nestling	 alongside	 this	positive	characterisation	of	shame	is	a	celebration	of	‘glory’	which,	if	‘true’,	is	grounded	in	‘justice’.123	Reputation-shame	was	subsequently	modified	and	commended	in	multiple	interlocking	discourses.	Chivalry,	for	example,	argued	Maurice	Keen,	was	an	‘ideology	of	honour’.124	And	the	words	of	Cicero,	of	course,	alongside	other	pagans,	were	woven	into	renaissance	humanism.	And	as	Keith	Thomas	has	phrased	it,	honour	and	reputation	were	among	the	‘ends	of	life’	in	early	modern	England.125		It	was	this	positive	take	on	reputation-shame	that	prospered	anew	in	moral	philosophy	in	the	mid	to	late	seventeenth	century	–	as	did	the	sense	of	self	that	it	generated.	Far	from	being	 excluded	 by	 reputation-shame,	 as	 the	 standard	 anthropological/historical	typologies	have	it,	a	sophisticated	and	densely	interiorised	self	was	something	that	might	flourish	within	it.	Pursuing	esteem,	and	acutely	sensitive	to	disapproving	glances,	we	find	ourselves	–	in	the	most	sympathetic	accounts	–	growing	in	integrity	and	legitimate	self-love.	This	comes	across	especially	strongly	in	Hume,	who	places	‘pride	and	humility’	first	among	the	passions.	These	are	opposite,	and	twinned,	feelings	that	operate	in	a	kind	of	
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dialectical	relation	to	either	augment	or	diminish	the	self.	Indeed,	for	Hume,	pride	quite	simply	‘produce[s]’	the	idea	of	the	self;	it	‘never	fails’	to	do	so.126	Note	that	the	kind	of	self	produced	by	pride	is,	by	definition,	confident,	content	–	a	self	not	divided	in	self-loathing	and	the	repression	of	one’s	own	desire,	as	we	saw	with	guilt-shame,	but	rather	capacious,	unified,	 integrated	 in	 self-worth,	 and	 in	 a	 celebration	 of	 passion.127	 Moreover,	 these	causes	of	pride	and	humility	do	not	operate	particularly	powerfully	on	us	until	we	filter	them	 through	 the	 lens	 of	 other	 people’s	 eyes	 –	when	 they	 come	 vividly	 alive.	 This	 is	because	‘our	reputation,	our	character,	our	name	are	considerations	of	vast	weight	and	importance’.	Things	of	which	we	might	be	proud	or	ashamed	have,	as	Hume	explains,	‘little	influence,	when	not	seconded	by	the	opinions	and	sentiments	of	others’.128		As	 the	 last	quotation	suggests,	 then,	 the	modern	self	 that	emerges	here	 is	open	rather	than	closed,	constructed	in	the	public	rather	than	the	private	realm,	the	external	shaping	the	internal	rather	than	carved	off	from	it.	One	can	trace	a	historical	movement,	that	is,	from	the	 idea	of	a	solipsistic	being	consumed	by	guilt-shame,	 to	one	radically	open	to	other	people,	and	therefore	–	if	managed	right	–	individually	robust.	The	selves	of	others	take	 up	 a	 kind	 of	 residence	 in	 one’s	 own	 self,	 and	 one’s	 own	 self,	 in	 turn,	 takes	 up	residence	 in	 others.	 For	 Hume,	 the	 reason	 why	 we	 particularly	 love	 having	 a	 good	reputation	is	that	the	pleasure	of	those	who	hold	us	in	good	repute	transfers	itself	to	us.	It	does	this	through	the	mechanism	of	‘sympathy’	–	that	natural	operation	‘which	renders’	the	sentiments	of	others	‘intimately	present	to	us’,	that	‘quality	of	human	nature’	of	which	there	is	none	‘more	remarkable’,	whereby	everyone,	‘even	the	proudest	and	most	surly	take	a	tincture	from	their	countrymen	and	acquaintance.’129	We	love	praise	so	much,	that	is,	not	only	because	we	understand	with	our	reason	that	other	people	approve	of	us,	but	also	because	we	feel	their	pleasure.130	Approval	and	disapproval,	praise	and	blame,	are	for	Hume	species	of	pleasure	and	pain,	and	their	expression,	or	imagined	expression	in	others,	sets	up	a	reverberating	pleasure	or	pain	in	us.	 ‘The	pleasure’,	concludes	Hume,	‘which	we	 receive	 from	 praise,	 arises	 from	 a	 communication	 of	 sentiments’.131	 Smith	
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takes	up	Hume’s	theory	of	sympathy	in	his	Theory	of	Moral	Sentiments,	explaining	that	‘fellow-feeling’	arises	when	we	re-experience	the	feelings	–	or	copies	of	the	feelings	–	of	others,	when,	‘by	the	imagination’,	as	he	puts	it,	‘we	place	ourselves’	into	the	situation	of	another,	and	‘enter	as	it	were	his	body,	and	become	in	some	measure	the	same	person	with	him,	and	thence	form	some	idea	of	his	sensations,	and	even	feel	something	which,	though	weaker	in	degree,	is	not	altogether	unlike	them’.132	And	again,	as	for	Hume,	our	pursuit	of	praise	is	bound	up	with	our	fundamental	openness	to	one	another.	According	to	Smith,	we	want	others	to	feel	the	same	pleasure,	the	same	‘agreeable	sentiments’,	about	us	that	we	feel	when	we	approve	of	them.133	The	preoccupation	with	reputation,	then,	finds	fertile	ground	in	a	post-Lockean	metaphysics	where	passions	–	like	other	ideas	–	immigrate,	reaching	into	us	from	outside,	and	circulate	between	people.	The	final	aspect	of	reputation-shame	that	I	would	like	to	signal	is	its	capacity,	indeed	its	purpose,	to	temper	and	regulate	the	mushrooming	public	sphere	–	the	coffee	houses,	city	streets	and	businesses,	scientific	societies	and	salons,	or,	simply,	the	‘five	or	six	friends	meeting	at	my	chamber’	who	encouraged	Locke	to	work	out	the	precise	limits	of	human	understanding	in	an	endeavour	that	became	the	Essay.134	This	kind	of	regulatory	shame	does	 not	 gruffly,	 brutally	 manoeuvre	 its	 population;	 it	 does	 not	 operate	 only	 on	 the	surface	 of	 selves,	 as	 the	 caricature	of	 shame-cultures	would	have	 it.	 Instead,	 it	 subtly	nudges	 us	 towards	 decent,	 seemly	 behaviour,	 working	 dynamically	 in	 and	 out	 of	subjectivities,	creating	governable	subjects	who	are	simultaneously	self-governing	and	stoutly	 interiorised.	 In	 his	 encyclopaedic	 taxonomy	of	 all	 things,	Wilkins	 lays	 out	 the	‘Vertues	 relating	 to	 the	due	moderating	of	our	actions’.	 First	of	 these	 is	 ‘Dignities	and	Esteem;	in	respect	of	the	Avoiding	or	Suffering	of	Disgrace’,	and	among	the	things	to	be	avoided	are	‘Shamelessness’	(again,	that	formulation	that	figures	shame	as	a	good	thing),	‘Audacity,	 fancy,	 immodest’.135	 Locke	 is	 committed	 throughout	 his	 oeuvre	 to	 the	government	of	communities	–	of	families,	the	republic	of	letters,	and	civil	society,	as	well	as	the	commonwealth.	It	is	no	surprise	to	find	that	he,	whom	we	have	already	met	as	a	key	witness	to	the	great	force	of	the	law	of	reputation,	looks	to	shame	as	an	indispensable	tool	of	gentle	control.	In	Of	the	Conduct	of	the	Understanding,	published	posthumously	in	
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1706,	a	work	dedicated	not	only	to	the	proper	conduct	of	our	minds	but	of	our	selves	in	community	 with	 others,	 Locke	 considers	 those	 times	 when	 we	 are	 gripped	 by	 some	passion,	so	that	our	thoughts	become	clogged	and	unfree,	and	we	are	unable	to	engage	in	meaningful	discussion.	The	‘shame’	that	this	kind	of	distance	and	distractedness	causes	‘to	well-bred	people,	when	it	carries	them	away	from	the	company,	where	they	should	bear	 a	 part	 in	 the	 conversation’	 is	 both	 proof	 of	 its	 wrongness,	 and	 a	 prompt	 to	 its	eradication.136		There	is	a	danger	that	reputation-shame	will	promote	at	the	very	least	a	morally	vacuous	agenda,	at	the	worst	an	emphatically	corrupt	one.	If	reputation-shame	simply	embodies	the	contingent	customs	of	a	particular	community,	if	it	ebbs	and	flows	with	the	arbitrary	whims	of	the	majority,	then	it	might	descend	into	the	blind	leading	the	blind.	However,	its	proponents	are	aware	of	this	precipice.	Locke,	as	I	have	indicated	above,	is	sometimes	anxious	about	the	ways	in	which	the	law	of	reputation	diverges	from	true	morality,	and	even	when	he	is	in	more	sanguine	moods,		he	thinks	that	while	it	regulates	society	pretty	well,	it	can	always	be	nudged	into	better	order.	It	is	often	thought	shameful,	for	example,	not	to	know	what	a	word	means	that	someone	else	has	uttered,	and	so	we	nod,	and	maybe	even	smile,	and	carry	on	none	the	wiser.	But,	insists	Locke,	ignorance	of	this	sort	should	not	be	a	source	of	shame.137	Our	conversations,	as	well	as	knowledge	and	society,	would	go	much	better	were	we	all	to	own	up	to	the	things	we	do	not	know.	Shame,	then,	need	not	be	a	blunt,	myopic	instrument,	but	might	instead	be	a	flexible,	sensitive,	and	urbane	device	of	social	reformation.		This	dual-aspect	of	reputation-shame	–	regulating	communities	while	itself	being	subject	to	ethical	self-regulation	–	developed	in	detail	in	the	moral	philosophy	of	the	eighteenth	century.	Hume	reins	in	his	moral	subjectivism	when	he	explains	that	it	is	proper	to	praise	not	 so	much	 that	which	brings	us	personal	pleasure	but	 rather	 that	which	pleases	us	when	we	take	up	a	‘common	point	of	view’,	when	we	find	that	perspective	which	is	the	‘the	same	to	every	spectator’,	or	as	he	puts	it	more	strongly	and	strikingly,	that	appeals	‘to	 the	esteem	of	a	 judicious	spectator’.138	Smith	enjoins	us	 to	 ‘remove	ourselves,	as	 it	were,	from	our	own	natural	station’,	establishing	‘a	certain	distance’	between	ourselves	
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and	our	moral	sentiments,	‘endeavouring	to	view	them	with	the	eyes	of	other	people’,	and	re-make	oneself	as	an	 ‘impartial	spectator’	of	oneself.139	The	driving	desire	 for	a	good	reputation	is	not	fuelled	simply	by	our	craving	for	the	admiration	of	others,	but	also	by	our	wanting	to	know	that	we	deserve	that	admiration.	Smith	draws	a	distinction	between	‘the	love	of	praise’	and	‘praise-worthiness’,	and	stresses	that	the	former	is	hollow	without	the	 latter.140	We	work	 out	whether	we	merit	 approval	 by	 emptying	 ourselves	 of	 the	vagaries	of	our	particular,	partial	passions	and	interests,	by	trying	to	see	ourselves	from	the	 outside.	Habermas	 long	 ago	 argued	 that	 publications	 such	 as	 Joseph	Addison	 and	Richard	Steele’s	Spectator,	 first	published	 in	1711	and	expressly	designed	 to	offer	 the	viewpoint	 ‘rather	 as	 a	 Spectator	 of	 Mankind,	 than	 as	 one	 of	 the	 Species’,	 were	instrumental	 in	 establishing	 the	 public	 sphere	 that	 he	 takes	 to	 be	 definitive	 of	enlightenment.141	While	Habermas’	thesis	has	been	criticised	and	revised,	it	is	clear	that	the	 spaces	 for,	 and	 the	ethos	of,	 socialisation	were	 changing.	 It	 seems	 to	me	 that	 this	transformation,	 together	with	 the	 introduction	 to	moral	 philosophy	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 an	unbiased	 spectator,	 who	 somehow	 stands	 both	 externally	 from	 and	 within	 us	 all,	 is	closely	bound	up	with	the	revivification	of	reputation-shame.	The	spectator	moderates,	legitimises,	and	strengthens	our	 interest	 in	our	how	we	are	seen,	 as	well	as	gesturing	towards	 a	 self	 that	 is	 extremely	 porous.	 Far	 from	 emptying	 out	 the	 self,	 then,	 the	preoccupation	with	reputation-shame	brings	the	outside	in,	creating	a	private	space	that	is	simultaneously	intensely	intersubjective.		IV	I	 began	 this	 article	 with	 a	 broad-brush	 historiographical	 picture	 of	 modernity	 as	involving	a	shift	from	shame	to	guilt,	from	hollow	to	replete	selves,	from	public	to	private	lives,	 and,	 to	 pick	 up	Williams’	 distinction,	 from	 ethics	 to	morality.	 I	 have	 argued	 by	contrast	that	two	concepts	–	guilt-shame	and	reputation-shame	–	can	be	discerned	side	by	 side	 in	 the	 seventeenth	 century.	 Guilt-shame	 is	 the	 tormented	 sense	 of	 one’s	 own	sinfulness,	 a	 function	 simply	 of	 being	 alive,	 brought	 on	 by	 mere	 introspection	 or,	connectedly,	being	seeing	by	God	who	dwells	within	and	without.	Reputation-shame	is	the	anxiety	that	one’s	behaviour	might	break	the	rules	of	one’s	community,	and	is	set	in	
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motion	by	the	fear	of	being	disapproved	of	by	other	people	and	–	close	on	its	heels,	almost	indistinguishable	from	it	–	the	eagerness	for	praise.		My	thesis	has	been	that	these	concepts	not	only	jostled	next	to	each	other,	but	that	if	there	was	a	shift	at	all,	 it	was	in	 the	other	direction,	 that	 is,	 from	guilt-shame	to	reputation-shame.	This	is	not	to	say	that	reputation-shame	was	a	new	thing;	its	traces	are	ancient.	Instead,	my	contention	is	that	while	guilt-shame	was	galvanised	by	Protestantism	in	the	early	 to	 mid-seventeenth	 century,	 reputation-shame	 was	 revitalised	 towards	 the	century’s	end,	on	account	of	the	conjuncture	of	the	rise	of	natural	religion,	the	decline	of	Biblicism,	and	a	corresponding	naturalistic	turn	in	moral	philosophy,	as	well	as	the	need	to	regulate	the	incipient	public	sphere	and	incarnate	the	centralising	state.142		Moreover,	the	self	that	emerges	in	this	civilising	process,	is	neither	the	empty	shell	often	associated	with	shame	(as	opposed	to	guilt),	nor	the	closed	off	individual	often	associated	with	modernity.	The	self	that	I	have	sketched	in	the	context	of	reputation-shame	is	both	abundantly	interiorised	and	radically	open	to	the	community,	bringing	the	outside	in,	and	in	turn	feeding	the	inside	back	out.	Locke	is	often	presented	as	a	pioneer	of	the	idea	of	autonomous	modern	selfhood,	a	developer	of	 the	Cartesian	ego	and	the	theatre	of	 the	mind.	It	is	true	that	for	him	the	understanding	is,	in	his	words,	‘a	closet	wholly	shut	from	light’,	with	the	exception	of	the	little	windows	of	the	senses.	However,	it	seems	to	me	that	he	also	envisages	bridges	and	walkways	between	rooms,	paved,	 in	part,	by	the	 law	of	reputation,	a	kind	of	spaghetti	junction	of	opinion	and	affect.143	The	self	that	stepped	into	the	 eighteenth	 century	 was	widely	 ajar,	 and	 filled	 up	 precisely	 by	 social	 interaction.	Having	one’s	eyes	on	others	did	not	stop	one’s	eyes	also	turning	inward	in	a	dynamic	of	self-constitution.	Furthermore,	this	was	an	integrated	self,	not	alienated	from	its	own	sin,	or	desire,	racked	by	self-division,	but	rather	a	self	made	whole	by	the	circulating	twinned	forces	of	glory	and	shame.	The	desire	for	reputation,	in	this	discourse,	was	not	something	to	be	ashamed	of,	nor	the	pleasure	of	self-approbation	something	to	be	avoided.	Stepping	back	now	from	this	excavation,	it	is	clear	that	concepts	are	not	cleanly	discrete	entities,	but	rather	blend	into	each	other.	The	two	discourses	that	I	have	unearthed	in	this	article	often	amalgamate.	Guilt-shame,	 for	example,	might	 involve	anxiety	about	what	
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other	people	think,	as	well	as	the	pain	of	one’s	own	conscience.	Reputation-shame	might	refer	 to	 sin	 as	 well	 as	 impropriety	 –	 concepts	 which	 often	 coincided	 in	 this	 deeply	Christian	age.	And	both	guilt-shame	and	reputation-shame	are	species	of	shame,	that	is,	they	both	pick	out	 the	 idea,	 the	horror,	of	being	 seen	negatively	–	while	 shame	more	generally	 has	 a	 porous	 semantic	 relation	 to	 guilt.	 Moreover,	 the	 configurations	 of,	relations	between,	and	evaluative	penumbrae	around	concepts	mutate	through	time	and	across	 speakers.	 As	 I	 have	 noted,	 many	 authors	 who	 acknowledged	 the	 power	 of	reputation	 were	 sceptical	 about	 its	 worth.	 John	 Bunyan,	 writing	 A	 Pilgrim’s	 Progress	contemporaneously	with	Locke,	thought	conformism	the	very	devil;	the	best	people	being	pilgrims	on	this	earth	who	‘fear	not	what	men	say’.144	Or	for	Jean-Jacques	Rousseau,	in	his	 Second	 Discourse	 (1755),	 it	 was	 the	 moment	 when	 ‘everyone	 began	 to	 look	 at	everyone	else	and	to	wish	to	be	looked	at	himself,	and	public	esteem	acquired	a	price’,	that	‘the	first	step’	was	taken	‘toward	inequality	and	vice’.145		Concepts	sprawl.	Their	deployment	is	inconsistent.	This	is	why	they	can	only	be	analysed	historically,	as	contingent	and	divergent	products	of	 language	 in	use.	They	are	not	 the	kinds	 of	 things	 that	 can	 be	 subject	 to	 abstract	 analysis,	 like	water,	 or	 gold.	 They	 are	mercurial.	In	the	case	of	shame,	there	is	no	essential,	or	definitive,	concept.	Instead	there	are	myriad,	overlapping,	and	contradictory	uses,	and	I	have	taken	core	samples	from	two	strains	of	use	at	particular	points	in	history.	Just	as	concepts	are	creatures	of	history,	so	might	they	be	lost	to	it.		If,	however,	I	turn	my	eyes	momentarily	and	finally	from	the	past	to	the	present,	I	see	the	remnants	of	these	two	uses	of	shame	in	our	own	speech,	albeit	somewhat	distorted.	We	talk	of	feeling	shame	about	features	of	ourselves	that	we	cannot	escape,	such	as	looking	or	lusting	a	certain	way,	where	the	shame	is	thought	of	as	a	punitive,	unwarranted	thing	resulting	 in	 misplaced	 self-loathing.	 And	 we	 talk	 of	 shamelessness	 with	 regard,	 for	example,	to	the	new	breed	of	self-confessed	post-truth	politicians.	It	sometimes	feels	in	the	twenty	first	century,	as	neoliberalism	bites	and	social	media	dissociates,	as	though	
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the	 sand	 is	 covering	 over	 that	 particular	 interpretation	 of	 shame	 that	 took	 it	 to	 be	 a	peculiarly	good	thing,	 that	understood	the	deliberating	gaze	of	 the	community	to	be	a	thing	of	value	and	a	guarantor	of	virtue.		
